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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a democratic government, in a fit of exasperation, de-
cides to do the unthinkable. Confronted by members of an ethnic
minority who they believe to be terrorists, but against whom they have
been unable to take legal action, top officials decide to play dirty. They
form a secretive paramilitary organization and arrange for it to be fi-
nanced and armed by the state. Its members take on dozens of
"missions;" their activities include kidnapping, torture, and outright
murder. High-ranking government officials are regularly informed of
these activities, sometimes while kidnappings or murders are underway.
* J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, 2004. A.B., summa cum laude, Harvard
University, 2000. Special thanks to Thomas Grey and Juan E. Garc6s for their insightful com-
ments and their guidance. Thanks also to Jason Morgan-Foster and Julia Sutherland of the
Michigan Journal of International Law for their helpful editing.
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Almost everybody would agree that participants in a plan of this sort
should face criminal sanctions. Indeed, not only could the sponsoring
government be said to have clearly violated several major human rights
conventions,' the participants' conduct would also constitute torture and
crimes against humanity, conduct proscribed by customary international
law.'
Now consider another scenario. A politically influential person in a
non-democratic country is known to have orchestrated or participated in
torture, forced disappearances, and crimes against humanity. That person
then travels abroad, visiting or moving to a country with established le-
gal institutions. Almost everybody would agree that this person also
deserves to face criminal sanctions.
But would the government officials in the first scenario, the traveler
in the second, or anybody else accused of crimes against international
law ever actually be prosecuted? International law itself suggests that the
answer needs to be yes. As Part I of this Note will demonstrate, countries
are obliged to prosecute this sort of behavior by treaties they have ad-
hered to, and by peremptory norms of customary international law.
These obligations to prosecute arise whenever crimes banned by treaty
or jus cogens (peremptory norms) occur in a nation's territory. In many
instances, they also arise whenever somebody-whether a citizen or a
I. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 114, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985)
[hereinafter Convention Against Torture] (requiring states to prevent torture in territory under
their jurisdiction, and stating that internal political instability or public emergency may not be
invoked to justify torture); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 6, 7, 9, 10, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174-76, 6 I.L.M. 368, 370-71
[hereinafter ICCPR] (requiring states not to arbitrarily deprive people of life, stating that peo-
ple will not be subjected to torture, stating that states will not subject persons to arbitrary
arrest or detention, and requiring humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty by the
state).
2. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. The Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court provides a generally accepted definition of crimes against humanity.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, art. 7, 37 I.L.M. 999,
1004 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. They include:
[any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: mur-
der; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population;
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of funda-
mental rules of international law; torture; ... ; [and] forced disappearance of
persons ...
Article 7 also clarifies that for the purposes of defining crimes against humanity,
"'[a]ttack directed against any civilian population' means a course of conduct involving the
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph I against any civilian population, pursu-
ant to or in furtherance of a state or organizational policy to commit such attack . On
torture, see Convention Against Torture, supra note 1, art. 1.
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foreigner-accused of committing such crimes abroad is found within a
nation's territory.
Will states really live up to these obligations? Are some states, and
some legal systems, better equipped to do so than others? After all, it is
one thing to commit to prosecuting horrendous offenses, or to recognize
that there is an obligation under customary international law to do so, yet
it is quite another to actually prosecute the perpetrators of such an of-
fense; this is particularly the case when the government has a strong
desire not to prosecute, because the accused are members of the gov-
ernment, because they are strong supporters of it, because they are
foreign allies of the government, or because the accuseds' government
might somehow make life uncomfortable for the government of the
prosecuting state. Parts II, III, and IV of this Note seek to examine these
issues.
While seemingly remote, questions about prosecuting internationally
proscribed offenses are not merely theoretical. Indeed, they are of un-
questionable salience for countries undergoing major institutional reform
as part of a transition to democracy. Such countries may have to deal
with a horrific recent history in a manner consistent with their interna-
tional obligations. Or they may simply need to position themselves
institutionally to deal with an uncertain future. Questions about unspeak-
able state-sponsored crimes are also not necessarily remote for those of
us fortunate enough to live in stable democracies. Amazingly, the facts
described in the first scenario at the beginning of this Note really oc-
curred, and in a developed, democratic country: Spain.' Regardless of a
country's history with democracy, it may at some point face the second
scenario, that of the traveler. For instance, just in the last six years, Span-
ish courts dealt with two other cases resembling this second scenario.
4
These events serve not only as jarring reminders that prosecution of
internationally prescribed offenses is a matter of relevance to everybody,
they also serve as a starting point for analyzing factors that facilitate or
3. A relatively thorough account of the group's activities can be found in Pilar Urbano's
recently published biography of the magistrate who investigated many of their crimes. See PILAR
URBANO, GARZON: EL HOMBRE QUE VEIA AMANECER (2000). The paramilitary organization in
question-the GAL-operated between 1983 and 1987, a period during which Spain was a
member of NATO. Id. at 379, 430. Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of
Spain, Dec. 10, 1981, 34 U.S.T. 3508, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/bt-a5.htm
(last visited Nov. 12, 2003). During the last two years in which the GAL was active, Spain was
also a member of the European Union. See The European Union, The History of the European
Union, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/history/1986/index-en.html (last visited Nov.
12,2003).
4. See URBANO, supra note 3, at 483-552 (describing the cases of Argentine naval
officer Adolfo Schilingo, who was arrested and tried in Spain for crimes committed in Argen-
tina, and Augusto Pinochet, who was arrested for crimes committed in Chile when he was
found to be in the European Union).
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impede the prosecution of such offenses. The Spanish officials who or-
ganized and directed the paramilitary organization-GAL-were
ultimately arrested, convicted, and sentenced to jail for their crimes.5 Not
surprisingly, their punishment came in the face of strong resistance from
other Spanish government officials.6 The cases dealing with foreigners-
those of ex-Argentine naval officer Adolfo Schilingo and former Chilean
dictator Augusto Pinochet-each produced an investigation, indictment,
and arrest, also in the face of strong opposition from the Spanish gov-
ernment.7 Thus, it is noteworthy that these prosecutions were successful
despite opposition from influential quarters.
It is also noteworthy that these prosecutions took place in a country
with a civil law justice system. Yet, this Note will suggest, it is not sur-
prising. The pages that follow argue that structural features existing in
many civil law systems of justice, but not in America's common-law-
based system, greatly facilitate the prosecution of human rights crimes,
whether committed in the forum state or abroad. They do so by helping
to overcome political impediments to prosecution, impediments that are
likely to arise in many human rights cases. As a consequence, this Note
will demonstrate, countries with justice systems marked by these fea-
tures will be more likely to comply with their international obligations to
prosecute.
Many authors have examined the features of civil law justice sys-
tems that are highlighted in this Note. Indeed, these features, and their
merits, have been extensively debated in the past.8 The phenomena of
5. See URBANO, supra note 3, at 175-248, 363-435; Stephen Burgen, Basque Summer
Terror Hits Tourism, THE TIMES (London), June 22, 2002, at 6; Spanish Officials Embezzled
Fund, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 23, 2002, at 14.
6. See URBANO, supra note 3, at 175-248, 363-435.
7. Id. at 483-552.
8. See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, GERMANY 1
(1977) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY] (outlining the German model of crimi-
nal procedure and suggesting that this model is, on the whole, "untroubled" in comparison
with the American model); MIRIAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY
(1986) (analyzing ideological foundations of common law and civil law justice systems, and
comparing the ideological currents he associates with these systems); Kenneth C. Davis,
Overall Perspective, in DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 195, 195-96 (Ken-
neth C. Davis ed., 1976) [hereinafter DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE] (advocating adoption of
European style compulsory prosecution rules-discussed infra); Richard Frase, Comparative
Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: How the French Do It, How Can We
Find Out, and Why Should We Care, 78 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1990) [hereinafter Frase, Criminal
Justice] (outlining the French model of criminal procedure and suggesting that adoption of
some French procedures would improve the overall quality of American criminal justice);
Richard S. Frase, Main-Streaming Comparative Criminal Justice: How to Incorporate Com-
parative and International Concepts and Materials into Basic Criminal Law and Procedure
Courses, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 773 (1998) [hereinafter Frase, Main-Streaming] (arguing that
foreign criminal procedures should be taught in introductory criminal law and criminal proce-
dure courses); Abraham Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in
[Vol. 25:211
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human rights prosecution in national courts has also received consider-
able attention in academic literature. Case studies and discussions of the
evolution of international human rights law abound.9 Criminal proce-
dures have even been discussed in the context of human rights norms
before; a few scholars have observed that incorporation of rights for the
accused into some human rights treaties has led to convergence among
legal systems, as nations adopt procedural protections in order to ensure
compliance. °
Although this Note uses these bodies of literature as a starting point,
it departs significantly from them. It looks at basic features of European
and American justice systems in the specific context of a human rights
case. Instead of examining how these systems' characteristics affect the
ordinary case, this Note examines how they affect the extraordinary case;
the case involving a crime so shocking that international law mandates
prosecution. And rather than examine whether substantive criminal laws
permit these human rights prosecutions to occur, or should permit these
human rights prosecutions to occur, this Note examines why they do occur
Three 'Inquisitorial' Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977) (suggest-
ing that European Civil law rules designed to constrain prosecutorial discretion are ineffective
in many cases); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United
States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1325, 1329-31 (1993) (arguing that the overall quality of criminal justice in America
would not be improved by imposing European style constraints on the discretion of prosecu-
tors); William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The
Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 6 (1992) (arguing that adversarial procedures should not have been adopted in
Italy because judges, prosecutors and lawyers, accustomed to a purely inquisitorial system,
will have difficulty learning to play the roles they need to fulfill after institution of the new
procedures).
9. See, e.g., Kent Anderson, An Asian Pinochet?-Not Likely: The Unfulfilled Interna-
tional Law Promise in Japan's Treatment of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, 38
STAN. J. INT'L L. 177 (2002); Evolution of Substantive International Criminal Law Through
Specialized International Criminal Tribunals and the ICC, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 276 (2000);
Kelly O'Neill, A New Customary Law of Head of State Immunity?: Hirohito and Pinochet, 38
STAN. J. INT'L L. 289 (2002); Jodi Thorp, Welcome Ex-Dictators, Torturers and Tyrants:
Comparative Approaches to Handling Ex-Dictators and Past Human Rights Abuses, 37 GONZ.
L. REV. 167 (2001/2002); Ant6nio Augusto Cangado Trindade, The Consolidation of the Pro-
cedural Capacity of Individuals in the Evolution of the International Protection of Human
Rights: Present State and Perspectives at the Turn of the Century, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 1 (1998).
10. See Frase, Main-Streaming, supra note 8 at 781-83; Richard Frase & Thomas Wei-
gend, German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar Problems,
Better Solutions, 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 358 (1995). One author has also studied
how evidentiary standards affect prosecution of human rights cases in common law and civil
law systems. See Moshe Cohen, Book Review, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 556 (1999) (reviewing
JULIANE KOKOTT, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW APPROACHES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
AMERICAN AND GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEMS (1998)).
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and will continue to occur in certain legal systems, but will not occur in
others even if authorized by law.
Part I of this Note outlines existing international obligations to
prosecute, and concludes that by now, both treaty-based and jus cogens-
based obligations have become firmly established as a part of interna-
tional law. Part II examines America's federal criminal justice system. It
illustrates how certain structural features of the American system would
permit prosecution of an internationally prescribed offense to be de-
railed, or simply never commenced, if executive branch officials deemed
such a course of action expedient. Part II examines the civil law-based
justice systems of four European countries: France, Spain, Italy and Ger-
many. This Part contends that four features of their justice systems help
to overcome potential obstacles to prosecution. Part IV focuses on Amer-
ica again, examining how the American system has dealt with criminal
conduct by public officials when the problem has arisen outside the
realm of human rights. This Part notes an adoption-just for cases
against public officials-of some of the features of the civil law systems
discussed in part three; this occurred through the institution of the spe-
cial prosecutor. Therefore, this Part concludes that mechanisms to ensure
compliance with international obligations to prosecute can easily be built
into American style justice systems.
These findings are significant, of course, because international obli-
gations to prosecute don't just exist to vex national political leaders.
They exist because prosecution gives victims the satisfaction of seeing
justice done, and promotes a sense that victims no longer have anything
to fear." They also exist because prosecution serves as a deterrent and
signals worldwide condemnation of human rights violations. 2 Thus, ju-
dicial systems that ensure obligations to prosecute will be met help the
people of that country, and the world, reap significant rewards. Those
that cannot guarantee compliance leave justice and deterrence to chance.
The emergence of the International Criminal Court ("ICC") gives
these findings an additional element of significance. The ICC can hear a
case only when national authorities where the alleged offense occurred
are unable or unwilling to investigate, or when they investigate but re-
fuse to prosecute substantiated allegations due to a simple lack of
interest. 3 Countries whose judicial systems guarantee prosecution of
meritorious accusations are therefore unlikely ever to give rise to a case
the ICC can hear. Indeed, an ICC prosecutor could presume that any case
11. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Comment, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute
Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449,461 (1990).
12. Id.; Diane F Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100YALE L.J. 2537,2542-44 (1991).
13. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
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not pursued was not pursued because it lacked merit. In contrast, coun-
tries like the United States, whose systems offer no such guarantees,
could give rise to a case over which the ICC has a legitimate claim to
jurisdiction. This means that an ICC prosecutor could not presume that a
case not pursued lacked merit. For countries that prefer to investigate
and try allegations of human rights abuses domestically, according to
their own procedural rules and norms, this makes the ability to guarantee
prosecution of meritorious cases a matter of considerable import.
This Note, however, is not about the benefits of human rights prose-
cution, or the pluses and minuses of domestic or international
prosecution of human rights violations. Rather, it simply seeks to eluci-
date various international obligations to prosecute, and to show how
legal systems with certain characteristics are more likely to produce
compliance with them. The full implications of these conclusions, how-
ever, are beyond the scope of the present Note.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OBLIGATIONS TO PROSECUTE
In recent years, the idea that nations have international obligations to
prosecute certain crimes has become increasingly accepted. 4 Obligations
to prosecute have been identified in a growing body of academic litera-
ture.'5 They have also been included in recent human rights conventions,
and have been embraced by the few courts that have had to consider their
existence."
14. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 311, 489 (2001). Obligations to prosecute are often viewed as obligations to
either try the alleged offender or extradite that person to a nation that will conduct a trial.
Formulated in this manner, the principle is frequently referred to by the Latin name aut dedere
aut judicare. See, e.g., Mohamed M. E1-Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New
Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 869, 947-48
(2002); Nicole Fritz & Allison Smith, Current Apathy For Coming Anarchy: Building the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391, 426 (2001). It should be noted
that an option to extradite does not obviate the need for effective prosecution mechanisms. In
many instances, there will be no nation requesting extradition of an individual alleged to have
committed human rights crimes. Mark S. Zaid, Will or Should The United States Ever Prose-
cute War Criminals?: A Need for Greater Expansion in the Areas of Both Criminal and Civil
Liability, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 447, 452 (2001). In this common situation, an obligation to
extradite or prosecute is an obligation to prosecute. Consequently, this paper will generally
refer to these obligations simply as obligations to prosecute.
15. See, e.g., Jimmy Gurul6, United States Opposition To The 1998 Rome Statute Es-
tablishing An International Criminal Court: Is The Court's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary
To National Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (2001-02); Orentlicher,
supra note 12; See also infra note 74.
16. See infra notes 26-51, 59-73 and accompanying text.
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Obligations to prosecute come from two different sources. Some
treaties create obligations to prosecute the acts that they forbid.'7 Obliga-
tions to prosecute have also been found to be a part of customary
international law; these obligations are considered to have gained suffi-
cient acceptance to bind all nations, whether or not they have obliged
themselves by treaty to prosecute the offenses these obligations attach
to. 1
8
A. Treaty Based Obligations to Prosecute
Many international treaties and conventions criminalize actions that
individuals can take. Major multilateral treaties prohibit taking hos-
tages,'9 hijacking aircraft,0 planting bombs for the purposes of
terrorism," genocide, torture, the practice of systematic racial segrega-• 24
tion, and war crimes.25 Thus, international treaty law prohibits a wide
variety of conduct.
Many of these international conventions also oblige signatory states
to prosecute acts that they proscribe.26 Some conventions impose this
17. See infra notes 19-51 and accompanying text; see also Mark A. Summers, The
International Court of Justice's Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How Has it Affected the De-
velopment of Universal Jurisdiction, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 63, 66 (2003) (noting that many
treaties create obligations to prosecute).
18. See infra notes 52-83 and accompanying text.
19. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted Dec. 17, 1979,
1316 U.N.T.S. 205, T.I.A.S 11,081. [hereinafter Hostage Convention].
20. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Hijacking Convention].
21. Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, June 3, 2002, 42 I.L.M. 19 (2003).
22. U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, S. TREATY Doc. No. 81-1 (1989), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280. (entered into force Jan. 12,
1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
23. Convention Against Torture, supra note 1.
24. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243.
25. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950),
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), and Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter
Geneva Conventions].
26. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 1, art. 7; ICCPR, supra note 1, art.
2(3); Genocide Convention, supra note 22, art. 4; American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 1, 14, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224, 232 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].
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obligation explicitly.27 Others have been interpreted by authoritative bod-
ies to implicitly contain such an obligation.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment is a well-known example of a treaty
that explicitly obliges signatories to prosecute. Signatory states under-
take to, "ensure that all acts of torture are offences under their criminal
law.' 29 Each signatory also agrees that when a person who is alleged to
have committed torture is found in its territory, it "shall .. . submit the
case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution," in the
event it does not extradite the alleged torturer. ° Therefore, torture is a
crime that most nations are internationally obligated to prosecute.
3'
Most nations have also bound themselves by treaty to prosecute
genocide.32 Following World War II, the newly formed United Nations
decided to formalize the international prohibition against genocide in the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide.33 This convention's text presents the prohibition on genocide as
inextricably linked with an obligation to prosecute it. In art. 1, signato-
ries "confirm that genocide... is a crime under international law which
they undertake to prevent and to punish., 34 Article 4 elaborates, stating
that persons "committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally respon-
27. For conventions that have already been signed, see Convention Against Torture,
supra note 1, art. 7; Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985,
25 I.L.M. 519. Recently proposed conventions include: Draft Declaration on the Protection of
all Persons From Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on
Human Rights, 47th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 10(c), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/49; Inter-
American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, arts. 1, 5, INTER-AM. C.H.R.
352, OEA/ser.L.N/II.74, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1988); Principles on the Effective Prevention and
Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, ESCOR Res. 1989/65, U.N.
ESCOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 1, 15th plen. mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (1989).
28. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
29. Convention Against Torture, supra note 1, art. 4. The precise definition of torture
employed by the convention can be found in art. 1.
30. Id. art. 7 (emphasis added).
31. 127 nations, including the United States, are parties to the Convention Against Tor-
ture. The United States ratified the Convention on November 20, 1994. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL
ADVISOR, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 478 (2001). It should
be noted that the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, also obliges sig-
natory states to punish torture and crimes related to it. It therefore largely duplicates the work
of the Convention Against Torture. See Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture, supra note 27, art. 6. For interpretation of this convention, see Orentlicher, supra note
12, at 2560 n.92.
32. 134 nations are parties to the Genocide Convention. The United States ratified on
February 23, 1989. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, supra note 31, at 392.
33. Genocide Convention, supra note 22.
34. Id. art. 6.
Fall 2003]
Michigan Journal of International Law
sible rulers, public officials or private individuals. 3  The imperative
"shall" in the Convention's 6th article underscores the obligation to
prosecute: "[p]ersons charged with genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal. 36
The Genocide and Torture Conventions are not the only ones with
explicit obligations to prosecute. The Inter-American Convention on the
Forced Disappearance of Persons creates an obligation to prosecute
those alleged to have orchestrated disappearances.3 ' The International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostage Convention") also
includes such an obligation.
Some human rights conventions that do not explicitly impose an ob-
ligation to prosecute have been interpreted to implicitly contain such an
obligation. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is
one example. 39 The Human Rights Committee, the body charged with
making authoritative interpretations of the Covenant, 40 has held that: "it
35. Id. art. 4.
36. Id. Significantly, articles three and six extend the obligation to prosecute, covering
incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.
Compare id., art. 3, with id. arts. 4, 6. Thus, the convention creates obligations to prosecute a
host of genocide-related crimes, some of which might not be covered by the obligation to
prosecute embedded in customary international law. See Orentlicher, supra note 12, at 2566.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States is one authority that
interprets the Genocide Convention as expanding the list of offenses that there is an obligation
to prosecute. Id. The Restatement suggests that customary international law imposes only an
obligation to prosecute genocide, while the convention also imposes obligations to prosecute
incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. See
id. at 2566 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 cmt. d (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]).
37. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 27, art.
6. For interpretation of this convention, see Orentlicher, supra note 12, at 2584; M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and Con-
temporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 81, 133 (2001).
38. Hostage Convention, supra note 19, art. 8. For interpretation of this convention, see
Orentlicher, supra note 12, at 2584. See also Summers, supra note 17 at 75-6 n.68 (citing
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785,
815-20 (1988), for the proposition that the Hostage Convention contains an obligation to
prosecute or extradite individuals who have taken hostages).
39. Louis Henkin, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 8-10 (Louis
Henkin ed., 1981). Created in 1966, the ICCPR was designed to create a comprehensive and
detailed international law of human rights, providing specificity to the general language of the
United Nations charter, and legalizing many of the rights outlined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Id. Although "[tihe possibility of requiring states' parties to punish viola-
tions was never seriously considered by the drafters of the international covenant," the
covenant's text does not preclude the imposition of such a duty. Orentlicher, supra note 12, at
2569-71. And the committee charged with overseeing the ICCPR has interpreted it to require
prosecution. Id. at 257 1.
40. Gwen K. Young, Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 427, 452
n.109 (2002) (citing Juan E. Mendez, The Right to Truth, in REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
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follows from art. 7, read together with art. 2 the Covenant, that ...
[c]omplaints about ill treatment must be investigated effectively by com-
petent authorities, [and that t]hose found guilty must be held
responsible.' It later clarified that holding a person responsible entails
punishment.42 In the case of an extralegal execution, the committee found
that a state is obliged "to bring to justice any persons found to be respon-
sible for [the] death;, 43 it has found states to be under a similar
obligation when confronted with forced disappearances." Both the
American Convention on Human Rights and the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms have
also been interpreted to contain an implicit obligation to prosecute viola-
tions. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights45 found such an
obligation in article 1 of the American Convention, which requires states
to guarantee the rights included in the Convention.46 The European Court
of Human Rights, which oversees the European Convention, also found
that preservation of rights entails prosecution of those who violate
them.4 ' Failure to provide for prosecution, it concluded, violates article 8
of that convention.48
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIRACUSA CONFERENCE 17-21 SEPTEMBER 1998, at 255, 260 (Christo-
pher C. Joyner & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1998)).
41. Orentlicher, supra note 12, at 2572 (quoting the Report of the Human Rights Com-
mittee, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex V, cmt. 7(16), para. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/37/40 (1982)).
42. Report of the Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 124/1982 : Muteba v.
Zaire, U.N. GAOR 107th Comm., 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex XIII, U.N. Doc. A/39/40
(1983). Thomas Buergenthal, a noted scholar, and a judge on the International Court of Jus-
tice, has interpreted the convention similarly. See Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and To
Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 39, at 77.
43. Orentlicher, supra note 12, at 2574 (citing the Report of the Human Rights Com-
mittee, Communication No. 84/1981: Dermit Barbato v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, Annex IX at 133, 11 a, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983)).
44. Id. (citing the Report of the Human Rights Committee, Communication No. R.7/30:
Bleier v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex X, U.N. Doc A/37/40
(1982); the Report of the Human Rights Committee, Communication 107/1981: Quinteros v.
Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex XXII at 216, U.N. Doc. A/38/40
(1983)).
45. The Inter-American Court Human Rights is charged with adjudicating questions of
compliance with the American Convention. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, arts. 31, 61-64. S. TREATY DoC. No. 95-2, 9 I.L.M. 673, 684, 691-92.
46. Orentlicher, supra note 12, at 2576.
47. Id. at 2580.
48. Id. Article 8 states:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
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It is noteworthy that many treaty-based obligations to prosecute do
not just cover offenses committed within a nation's territory.49 They im-
pose obligations to prosecute or extradite any person accused of
committing the offenses they are linked to, regardless of the offender's
nationality or where the offense was committed; the offender just needs
to enter a nation's territory for the obligation to attach. The Convention
Against Torture provides one example. Its seventh article states: "The
State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to
have committed any offense ... is found, shall ... if it does not extradite
him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution."50 The Geneva Conventions of 1949, which outlaw war
crimes, are equally clear. "The duty to punish attaches ... to all signa-
tory states ... and it exists without regard to the nationality of the
perpetrator or victim or to the place where the crime took place."5' Thus,
countries face treaty based obligations to prosecute their own nationals,
and even foreigners, for certain crimes committed abroad. If political
officials would prefer to let such people remain in the country without
being prosecuted, giving effect to their preference would place the coun-
try in violation of international law.
In sum, numerous human rights conventions either explicitly or im-
plicitly require states to prosecute violations of their provisions.
Consequently, these treaties create international obligations that states
violate when they fail to investigate allegations and prosecute those that
are substantiated.
B. Obligations to Prosecute Under
Customary International Law
Not only are many nations bound by treaty to prosecute certain
crimes, all nations are now considered bound by customary international
law to prosecute crimes that have achieved jus cogens status. Although
these crimes are largely the same as those that states have undertaken by
treaty to prosecute, neither category fully encompasses the other.52
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
European Convention, supra note 26, art. 8.
49. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture, supra note 1, art. 7; Geneva Conventions,
supra note 25; Hostage Convention, supra note 19; Inter-American Convention Against Ter-
rorism, supra note 21.
50. Convention Against Torture, supra note 1, art. 7.
51. Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, War Crimes, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUBLIC INT'L L. 294,
297 (1982). See also Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, 71 INT'L L.
STUDIES 17, 21 (1998) (agreeing with Jescheck's analysis of the Geneva Conventions); Sum-
mers, supra note 17, at 77 (interpreting the Geneva Convention similarly).
52. See supra notes 19-51 and accompanying text; infra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, customary international law expands the realm of situations
in which states have an obligation to prosecute.
Jus cogens norms are norms of customary international law that a
significant majority of states have agreed to accord a special status.
53
Specifically, jus cogens are norms that states view as peremptory, such
that derogation from them is not permitted.M This means, moreover, that
the norm is binding even on aberrant states that profess to disagree with
it.55 A norm can be identified as a jus cogens norm by its appearance in
numerous treaties, adjudications, and scholarly works.56 Certain actions
done by individuals are considered crimes under customary international
law.5 7 Several of these crimes have achieved jus cogens status, they in-
clude piracy, slavery, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity."
53. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999); Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344 [hereinafter Vienna Convention];
LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 210-14
(1988); see also G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 159
(1983).
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999) (U]us cogens is a "mandatory norm
of general international law from which no two or more nations may exempt themselves or
release one another."); Vienna Convention, supra note 53, art. 53 (jus cogens is a "peremptory
norm of general international law [that] is ... accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same char-
acter.").
55. Ladan Askari, Girls' Rights Under International Law: An Argument For Establish-
ing Gender Equality As A Jus Cogens, 8. S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 3, 5 (1998); Pia
Zara Thadhani, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Is Unocal the Answer?, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 619, 623 (2000).
56. Tawny Aine Bridgeford, Imputing Human Rights Obligations On Multinational
Corporations: The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again In Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
1009, 1022 n.56 (2003) (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
714 (1992)); Kent V. Anderson et al., Challenging the Detention of a Client Who Has Been
Declared a Material Witness or the Incommunicado Detention of Any Client, CHAMPION,
April 2003, at 34, 41; Bassiouni, supra note 37, at 117-18.
57. See Michael J. Kelly, Can Sovereigns Be Brought to Justice? The Crime of Geno-
cide's Evolution and the Meaning of the Milosevic Trial, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 257, 319,
(2002); Bassiouni, supra note 37, at 106.
58. Kelly, supra note 57, at 319; Bassiouni, supra note 37, at 106; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
The Sources and Content of International Criminal Law: A Theoretical Approach, in 1 INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 41 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 36, § 102(2); Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 717 (holding that the inter-
national law prohibition on torture has achievedjus cogens status). El Ziedy, moreover, states:
Th[e] legal basis [for saying that genocide, war crimes, and crimes against human-
ity have achieved jus cogens status] can be found in international pronouncements,
or what can be called international opinio juris, that reflect the recognition that
these crimes are deemed part of general customary law. Language in preambles ...
or other provisions of treaties applicable to these crimes, also indicate that these
crimes have a higher status in international law. Another indication is the large
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International instruments that reflect the sentiment of an overwhelm-
ing number of nations, as well as judicial decisions and academic
literature, suggest that an obligation to prosecute crimes that have
achieved jus cogens status has come to be considered an integral part of
the jus cogens prohibition on these crimes. Perhaps nowhere is this
clearer than in the charter of the International Criminal Court, a docu-
ment highly indicative of international sentiment, as only a handful of
nations failed to sign it.59 The preamble states that there is "an absolute
duty to prosecute," international law crimes that have achieved jus co-
gens status. 6° "The most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and ... their effective
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level.'
Indeed, the process by which the ICC initiates cases reflects a belief that
it is really the duty of states to prosecute these offenses. ICC prosecutors
refer all allegations to authorities in the state where the alleged offense
occurred. The case moves forward in the international court only if, after
a time, the national authorities have not begun the appropriate proceed-
61ings, and will not do so.
Mention of a duty to prosecute offenses that have achieved jus co-
gens status in recent treaties, conventions, and declarations reinforces the
idea that obligations to prosecute follow necessarily from the jus cogens
status of these offenses. 63 As was previously mentioned, the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Con-
vention Against Torture, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture, the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disap-
pearance of Persons, and the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages all mention the obligation to prosecute. 64 So do the
Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal,
Arbitrary and Summary Executions, a document endorsed by the U.N.
number of States that have ratified treaties related to these crimes.... The writings
of scholars and diplomats further buttress this legal foundation.
El-Ziedy, supra note 14, at 947 (internal citations omitted).
59. 139 nations have signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. See
Coalition for the International Criminal Court Website: Currently the Rome Statute of the ICC
has 139 Signatories and 90 Ratifications, at http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/2003/Rome-
Statute-ICC-Ratifications7jun03.htm. El-Ziedy, supra note 14, at 947 (suggesting that inclu-
sion of this principle in the charter of the ICC indicates that the principle has achieved jus
cogens status).
60. George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 Bu~FF. CRIM.
L. REv 51, 61 (1999) (citing Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.).
61. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
62. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17, 18.
63. Orentlicher, supra note 12, at 2584.
64. See id.; supra notes 16-35 and accompanying text.
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General Assembly in 1989.65 "The frequent reiteration of the duty to pun-
ish grave violations of physical integrity in international instruments is
evidence that the duty is, or is emerging as, a customary norm."6
This conclusion is supported by the pronouncements of tribunals that
have dealt with alleged violations of customary international law. Some
such prosecutions have taken place in foreign courts exercising universal
jurisdiction on the basis of complementarity-this is the principle that
while international law crimes should be prosecuted in the country
where they occurred, other countries must do so when that state cannot
or will not fulfill its obligation. One early affirmation came in the case
of Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi tried in Israel in the 1960s. In rejecting
Eichmann's jurisdictional appeal, the Israeli Supreme Court suggested
that the state where the crime occurred has an obligation to try the per-
son." But, it held, when that state fails to do so, other nations are
authorized to prosecute as well. 69 Recent Spanish decisions involving
crimes of the Conosur dictatorships adopt similar arguments. These pro-
ceedings took for granted the desirability of prosecution being conducted
where offenses occurred.0 However, Judge Baltasar Garzon wrote in the
case of Argentine naval officer Adolfo Schilingo, "crimes that attack...
the most basic values ... of the modem international community ...
must be prosecuted," even if this means prosecution in another nation
because the state where the crime occurred refuses to fulfill its responsi-
bility.7' Another Spanish court reiterated these sentiments a few months
later in the case of Chilean General Augusto Pinochet.' The Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia endorsed the same
analysis shortly before the Spanish courts. 73 Relevant courts, it seems,
have accepted the existence of an obligation to prosecute.
65. Orentlicher, supra note 12, at 2584.
66. Id.
67. On the concept of complementarity, see Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The
United States of America and the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMp. L. Supp.
381, 389 (2002); Gumlr, supra note 15, at 10-14. Prosecutions in domestic courts conducted
on the basis of complementarity include that of Adolf Eichmann, who was tried in Israel for
crimes committed in areas controlled by Nazi Germany, Attorney General of Israel v.
Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 285 (Israel Supreme Court 1962); the Schilingo case, SAN, Mar. 25,
1998 (Sumario 19197-L, Auto, Juzgado Central de Instrucci6n num. 5), at
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/espana/compe.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2003); and the
Pinochet case, SAN, Sept. 15, 1998 (Sumario 19/97-J, Auto, Juzgado Central de Instrucci6n
num. 6), at http://www.chip.cl/derechos/images/l509.rtf (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
68. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 285.
69. Id.
70. Pinochet, supra note 67, Fundamento Juridico Cuarto.
71. Schilingo, supra note 67, Fundamento Juridico Noveno (translation by the author).
72. Pinochet, supra note 67, Fundamento Juridico Cuarto.
73. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, 155 (Dec. 10,
1988), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ cases/jugemindex-e.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
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Unofficial sources have also largely agreed with the existence of
such an obligation. A customary international law-based obligation to
prosecute jus cogens offenses has been broadly accepted in academia.1
4
Indeed, one academic commentator has gone so far as to call the obliga-
tion "black letter law" as it applies to genocide and grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions.75 The International Law Commission has also
found that states have an obligation to extradite or prosecute people who
commit crimes that have achieved jus cogens status.76 An obligation has
even been recognized by the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of For-77,,
eign Relations. A government violates international law "if, as a matter
of state policy, it practices, encourages or condones," crimes that are
prohibited by peremptory norms. 71 "[A] government may be presumed to
have encouraged or condoned these acts ... if such acts, especially by its
officials, have been repeated or notorious and no steps have been taken
to prevent them or to punish the perpetrators," the Restatement ex-
plains.79
Customary international law-based obligations to prosecute, like
those derived from the Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Con-
ventions, even cover offenses committed outside a nation's territory.
Because jus cogens offenses "undermine the foundations of the interna-
2003) (holding that a necessary corollary of the jus cogens prohibition on torture-a crime
against humanity when committed systematically-is that national judiciaries are obliged not
to condone acts that constitute torture).
74. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 37, at 148; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M.
WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE, THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 3-5 (1995); EI-Ziedy, supra note 14, at 946-47; Guruld, supra note 15, at 15;
Stephen P. Marks, Forgetting "The Policies and Practices of the Past": Impunity in Cambo-
dia, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 17, 22 (1994); Orentlicher, supra note 12, at 2582-95;
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1996); Jordan J.
Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghaistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 533, 540 (2002); Fritz & Smith, supra note 14, at 426 (stating that the obligation to
extradite or prosecute-aut dedere aut judicare-is "non-derrogable" with respect to jus co-
gens crimes); Lee A. Steven, Comment, Genocide and the Duty to Extradite or Prosecute:
Why the United States is in Breach of its International Obligations, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 425
(1999); Johan D. van der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1, 66 (2000); Graham Blewitt, Comment, Identify-
ing and Prosecuting War Crimes: Two Case Studies-The Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 12
N.YL. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 631,636-39 (1995) (remarks of Mr. Graham Blewitt).
75. Michael Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent
With the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 34 (2001).
76. Summers, supra note 17, at 78 n.82 (citing Draft Code of Crimines Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/51/10
(1996), reprinted in [1996] 11(2) Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 15, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (Part 2), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/l1996/
chap02.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003)).
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tional community," states are required to cooperate in bringing perpetra-
tors to justice.0 This means that states must either extradite or prosecute
perpetrators of jus cogens offenses who enter their national territory.8'
Moreover, the obligation to prosecute jus cogens offenses committed
extraterritorially has itself achievedjus cogens status.
Today it is generally recognized that customary international law
of a peremptory nature places an obligation on each nation-state
to search for and bring into custody and to initiate prosecution of
or to extradite all persons within its territory or control who are
reasonably accused of having committed, for example, war
crimes, genocide .. 82
The obligation to prosecute offenses committed abroad has achieved
this status due to the number of treaties in which it appears, 3 and due to
the widespread support these treaties enjoy."
In sum, there exist a large number of international obligations to
prosecute. Many are treaty based. As result, states can control, to a cer-
tain extent, the number of situations in which they will face svch an
obligation. Yet, customary international law also imposes obligations to
prosecute the most serious of international law crimes. These are obliga-
tions applicable to all states. Therefore, all states must be able to ensure
prosecution of at least some offenses.
II. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM AND OBLIGATORY PROSECUTION:
To what extent are national judicial systems structured to deal with
crimes so universally condemned that failure to prosecute is not an op-
tion? This will largely be a function of how well the system can
overcome political obstacles to prosecution. And these obstacles could
be considerable. The government of a nation is likely to be linked to any
such crime committed within its borders; at the very least, officials are
80. Steven, supra note 74, at 441-42 (1999) (citing Bassiouni & Wise, supra note 75, at
24).
81. Steven, supra note 74, at 442.
82. Paust, supra note 74, at 300 n.1, see also Fritz & Smith, supra note 14, at 426;
Bassiouni, supra note 37, at 148-49.
83. Steven, supra note 74, at 447. Steven notes that an obligation to prosecute such
offenses, or extradite the perpetrator, appears in "over 70 international criminal law conven-
tions." Id.
84. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 12-13 (2d. rev. ed. 1987). For further discussion of customary international law
based obligations to prosecute offenses committed abroad, see William A. Schabas, Justice,
Democracy, and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible
Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523, 555 (1996).
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likely to be complicit in it, or close to people who are. 85 Hence, there will
be powerful political pressure not to pursue allegations seriously. Even
where a regime has changed, there might be powerful political forces
operating to discourage prosecution. A government might deem it politi-
cally expedient not to pursue the crimes of its predecessor out of fear of
being tarnished by links to that predecessor, desire to court supporters of
86the previous government, a perception that prosecution could cause
political instability," or a simple desire to spend energy and resources on
other things." The government may also have incentives not to try for-
eigners who enter the country. The foreigner might be linked to a
government that was or is supported by the government of the forum
state; thus, the forum state's government might be seeking to avoid ex-
posure of its own complicity, or even just an appearance of guilt by
association. That government may also seek to ignore allegations be-
cause it believes that its political, diplomatic, or economic interests in
the accused's home country would be better served by protecting the
accused; this is particularly the case if the accused's government threat-
ens reprisals against those interests should charges be brought. 9
America's common-law legal system is designed in such a way that
the government's political opposition to prosecution can make it impos-
sible to punish violations of international human rights law. As a result,
prosecution will depend on the political will of the executive, who for
the self-interested reasons previously mentioned, may be strongly disin-
clined to see crimes prosecuted. Three basic features of the American
system make this so: prosecutorial discretion, the government's exclu-
sive power to prosecute, and the fact that prosecution is a function of the
executive branch.
While these features do not all exist in every U.S. state,9° they are
present in the federal system, which is the system of greatest relevance
for human rights prosecution. This is because the crimes which there is
an international obligation to prosecute-genocide, torture, war crimes,
85. Hari M. Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing Hu-
man Rights Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191, 206 (1997); Blewitt, supra note 74, at
654-55.
86. Marks, supra note 74, at 38.
87. Marianne Geula, Note, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an
Alternate Means of Addressing Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided Society, 18
B.U. INT'L L.J. 57, 73 (2000).
88. Id.
89. Email from Juan E. Garcds y Ram6n, Chief Attorney for the Private Plaintiffs in the
Spanish case against Augusto Pinochet and others to author (Jan. 22, 2003, 12:15 PST) (on
file with author).
90. See, e.g., Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357, 374-77 (1986).
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etc.-are federal offenses.9 Although it is likely that conduct that could
be classified as genocide, torture, or war crimes would also violate state
law, it is possible, and indeed likely, that such crimes would not occur
within the jurisdiction of a U.S. state. For instance, the prohibitions on
genocide and war crimes cover acts committed outside the United
States.9' The federal prohibition on torture only covers acts committed
outside the United States, or conspiracies to commit acts outside the
United States.93 In addition to acts committed outside the United States,
acts committed on military bases would not be subject to the laws of a
state.94 Moreover, while acts committed in the District of Columbia-
where many government officials work, and where many orders to lower
level officials are given-are subject to local and federal law, prosecu-
tion of non-petty offenses there is conducted by federal officials. 95
Therefore, the likelihood that the U.S. fulfills its obligations depends
heavily on the structure of the federal prosecutorial system.
The relationship between federal prosecutors and the executive
branch gives cause for concern that alleged human rights abuses will not
be impartially pursued. This is because, under the current system, the
prosecutor's agenda can and likely will be fully aligned with the execu-
tive's political interests. The manner in which prosecutors are selected is
one major reason why. U.S. Attorneys-the federal government's chief
prosecutors in each district-are selected by the President.96 While they
officially receive four year terms, they traditionally resign when a new
president is elected.97 The President, moreover, has the power to remove
U.S. Attorneys.9 Personnel decisions at Main Justice are also heavily
91. 18 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2002) (banning genocide); 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2002) (ban-
ning torture); 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2002) (banning war crimes).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) (applying statute to "[wihoever, whether inside or outside the
United States, commits a war crime"); 18 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(2) (banning genocide committed
abroad by U.S. nationals).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2002) (applying statute to "[w]hoever outside the United
States commits or attempts to commit torture.").
94. Military courts would be responsible for offenses committed by members of the
military, but ordinary federal courts would have jurisdiction over offenses committed by civil-
ians, or civilians who had directed offenses committed by members of the military. See 10
U.S.C. § 802 (2002); U.S. v. McIntyre, 4 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1925) (holding that civilians are
not subject to military jurisdiction); Cole v. Laird, 468 F.2d. 829 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that
civilians are not subject to court martial, except when they accompany the military in the field
during a declared war).
95. D.C. CODE § 23-101(c) (2002).
96. Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court
Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REv. 363, 380 (2001).
97. See Frank M. Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates Itself, 65 CAL L. REv. 597,
602 (1977); YALE KAMISAR ET AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 871 (3d ed. 2000).
98. Wiener, supra note 96, at 404. Assistant U.S. Attorneys, in turn, are hired by the
U.S. Attorney. While these attorneys are not considered political appointees, and thus need not
resign when the administration changes, turnover among Assistant U.S. Attorneys is quite
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influenced by politics. "The President appoints over two hundred De-
partment officials who serve at his pleasure."99 Often, these officials are
"active members of the President's political party.' '1 °° Many also "have
strong ambitions for higher appointive office."' ' Moreover, most recent
Presidents have named a close political ally as Attorney General.' 02 The
Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Criminal Division are also often chosen due to their partisan activi-
ties.103
The Attorney General, in particular, is not only a political appointee,
but also performs a job that is highly political. The Attorney General is a
member of the Cabinet. Consequently, he "necessarily has close and
continuing relationships with the President,"'1 ' and "is enmeshed in the
administration."' ' Moreover, the Attorney General traditionally has been
one of the President's closest political advisors. '06 Thus, the Attorney
General is someone with a strong personal and professional interest in
preserving the administration's reputation and authority.
The Department of Justice is organized so as to give the Attorney
General and other top officials-those with the greatest political motive
to protect the administration-complete control over how a case is han-
dled. "It is clear today that the Attorney General has ultimate authority
over U.S. attorneys."'0 7 He can take control of an existing case or investi-
gation by "directing more immediate subordinates to supervise closely
the U.S. Attorney's handling" of it.'08 Moreover, the Attorney General
can order that a matter be handled exclusively from Washington. °" While
high. KAMISAR ET AL, supra note 97, at 871. Therefore, it is likely that many of the prosecu-
tors in an office will have been selected by the present U.S. Attorney. The Attorney General
retains the authority to both hire and fire assistant U.S. Attorneys, although this rarely occurs
in practice. Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 600.
99. Dan W. Reicher, Note, Conflicts of Interest in Inspector General, Justice Depart-




102. Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 601. Indeed, since World War H, most Presidents
have chosen somebody who played a crucial role in their election campaign to serve as Attor-
ney General. KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 119 (1992).
103. Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 601-02.
104. Harriger, supra note 102, at 118 (citing Arthur S. Miller, The Attorney General as
the President's Lawyer, in LUTHER A. HUSTON ET AL., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES 41 (1968).
105. Id. at 119.
106. Id. at 118.
107. Wiener, supra note 96, at 381.
108. Id.
109. Id. Technically, removal of a U.S. Attorney necessitates Presidential approval. See
Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 600.
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only a tiny number of investigations are initiated or taken over by Main
Justice," this is more likely to occur when the administration has a
strong interest in a matter. And because the President and Attorney Gen-
eral can fire U.S. Attorneys and their assistants,"' prosecutors have no
ability to resist supervision.
The nature of the Attorney General's position and of the Justice De-
partment's structure therefore creates serious potential for conflicts of
interest when the Department must investigate alleged wrongdoing by
government officials. These conflicts can be both personal and politi-
cal."2 On a personal level, an official may supervise an investigation that
targets a friend within the administration,' or that could uncover his
own misconduct." 4 Additionally, an official seeking advancement may
control an investigation that a superior wants to reach a certain result for
political reasons; the official may therefore have career-related motives
for pursuing a particular course of conduct.' There is also potential for
"partisan conflicts."" 6 An official may feel loyalty to an administration
and consider its protection to be part of his job."7 All of these interests
conflict with the prosecutor's duty to pursue the public interest;" 8 they
create a risk that, when interest and duty conflict, interest will prevail.
This risk is particularly great because the highest officials-those most
likely to give an order that protects the administration by failing to en-
force the law, or most eager to pass along such an order when one is
issued by the President or requested by another administration official-
can control the actions of all federal prosecutors.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some officials who control federal
prosecutions do view political goals and loyalties as being more impor-
tant than their obligation to the law. President Nixon, for example,
actively participated in efforts to frustrate the Watergate investigation. "9
On a more mundane level, Professor Tuerkheimer-a former prosecutor
110. Id.
111. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Technically, removal of a U.S. Attorney
necessitates Presidential approval. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 600.




116. Id. at 978.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 610. For example, Nixon ordered the head of the
Criminal Division, Henry Peterson, to send him information about the investigation, which he
then passed along to its targets. Lloyd Cutler, Conflicts of Interest, 30 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1018
(1981). Nixon also asked Peterson to let him know if John Dean made statements implicating
him. Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 609. As President, Nixon was charged by Article III of the
Constitution with enforcing the laws of the United States. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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who studies the Justice Department-recounts that when an Assistant
U.S. Attorney subpoenaed a man linked to Richard Nixon to testify
about illegal campaign contributions, the U.S. Attorney had the subpoena
withdrawn and instead interviewed the man personally.'20 Indeed, as evi-
dence that decisions about prosecution will be made, first and foremost,
to protect the administration, Tuerkheimer cites Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral Richard Kleindeinst's remarks to a conference of U.S. Attorneys. "It
is of the utmost importance to keep this administration in power," he told
them. "[Y]ou men must do everything you can to ensure that result."'
2'
In and of itself, the political pressure on federal prosecutors makes it
much harder to pursue a human rights case against someone a top gov-
emnment official does not want prosecuted. This influence poses a
potentially insurmountable barrier in light of the broad discretion given
American prosecutors. In the federal courts, a prosecutor's discretion not
to charge a crime is nearly absolute. As recently as 1995, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its commitment to broad discretion for federal prosecu-
tors, holding that the choice to prosecute is a "special province of the
executive."' 23 This means that a person who has not been prosecuted can-
not challenge the federal prosecutor's exercise of discretion in any
case. 24 Even the victim "has no constitutional right to insist on prosecu-
tion" by federal officials.'
25
120. Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 607. The man involved was Frank Thornton, an
employee of Nixon's friend L. Amholt Smith. The U.S. Attorney was Harry Steward, of the
Southern District of California. Id.
121. Id. at 601.
122. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Smith v. United
States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967).
123. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citing Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)).
124. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2nd Cir.
1973).
125. In re Fraley, No. 91-7585, 1991 4th Cir. WL 135214, at *1 (N.D. W. Va. July 25,
1991) (citing Sattler v. Johnson, 857 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1988)). There are two reasons why
victims are unable to compel federal prosecution: 1) lack of standing and 2) judicial assump-
tion that prosecutorial decision-making is not amenable to review.
When a person has not been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution, he lacks standing
to challenge any prosecutorial decision. Inmates of Attica, 477 F.2d at 378. This is because,
"in American jurisprudence, at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in
the prosecution or non-prosecution of another." Id. (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 619 (1973). The sole exception occurs when failure to prosecute would leave the
citizen in immediate "danger of direct personal injury." See id. However, when injunctive
relief against the source of the threat would suffice, this standing requirement will not be met.
Id. In the context of torture, war crimes, or another internationally proscribed offenses, it is
conceivable that a victim could meet this requirement. More likely, however, any complaint
will be filed after the fact, thereby depriving the victim of standing to challenge the prosecu-
tor's handling of the case.
Courts have also refused to compel prosecution on the ground that prosecutorial deci-
sion-making is not amenable to review. As then Circuit Judge Warren Berger put it: "Few
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The federal prosecutor's discretion extends well beyond the decision
whether to charge a crime about which there is sufficient evidence. It
encompasses decisions about what charges to bring, where to bring
them, and when. 26 Most significantly, it covers the decision about
whether to even investigate an allegation, and how to do so. ' Therefore,
the government can decide that allegations of torture, war crimes, etc.
against its officials or their allies simply will not be looked into, and
thereby prevent the truth of what happened from being ascertained.
The prohibition on privately prosecuted criminal cases in the fed-
eral system is closely related to the concept of absolute prosecutorial
discretion.'28 "It is well settled that a private citizen has no right to
prosecute a federal crime.'' 29 This is because, in American legal
thought, crimes are offenses against the community, not the victim, and
punishment seeks to promote social goods-like deterrence, rehabilita-
tion, and retribution-not individual ones. 3 ° Prohibiting victims, or
other private parties from initiating criminal cases further extends the
subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion
in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceedings." Newman, 382 F.2d at 480.
The Second Circuit elaborated on this reasoning, asserting that "the manifold imponderables
which enter into the prosecutor's decision to prosecute or not to prosecute make the choice not
readily amenable to judicial supervision." Inmates of Attica, 477 F.2d at 380. For this reason,
even when failure to prosecute does leave a person in imminent danger of injury, a court will
not order a federal prosecutor to bring charges. Id. Thus, a victim of torture or war crimes, for
example, would be unable to compel prosecution of these crimes by the government, even if
he had standing to bring a case.
There are some grounds on which a prosecutor's exercise of discretion can be chal-
lenged. A person against whom there is sufficient evidence to secure an indictment can
challenge the decision to indict on equal protection grounds if it appears to have been racially
motivated. See, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832). Such a
person can challenge the indictment on due process grounds if it was motivated by "vindic-
tiveness" elicited by the exercise of a procedural right, such as appeal of a prior conviction.
See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). However, none of these grounds enable a person
who has not been prosecuted to challenge the exercise of discretion.
126. Teah R. Lupton, Preliminary Proceedings: Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEo. L.J.
1279, 1279-82 (2002).
127. Id. There are a small number of limits on prosecutorial discretion. See Todd D.
Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 563, 596-97 (1991). A prosecutor may not be able to unilaterally dismiss charges already
brought. Id. Moreover, a court can name private prosecutors to handle criminal contempt pro-
ceedings when the U.S. Attorney does not want to prosecute. Id. Finally, some provisions of
the lapsed independent counsel statute, discussed in more detail in part IV, infra, compel ac-
tions by the Department of Justice. Id.
128. See, e.g., Keenan v. McGrath, 328 F.2d 610, 610-11 (1st Cir. 1964); New York v.
Muka, 440 E Supp. 33, 36 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); 63C AM. JUR. 2D Prosecuting Attorneys § 43
(2002).
129. Muka, 440 F. Supp. at 36.
130. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A Means of Preventing
Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 CAL. L. REV. 727, 728
(1988).
Fall 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
federal prosecutor's discretion; not only can he decide if the govern-
ment will pursue the case, he has discretion to decide if it gets into the
court system at all.
Absolute unreviewable and uncircumventable discretion about
charging and investigation is therefore entrusted to federal prosecutors;
they in turn are subject to direction from officials with strong incentives
not to allow development of cases damaging to the administration. This
suggests that attempts to investigate officials or their allies will face for-
midable barriers. Historical evidence confirms this conclusion.
The "Saturday Night Massacre" is perhaps the most prominent ex-
ample of an administration obstructing investigation of its own activities.
When the prosecutor investigating Watergate sought access to tapes of
President Nixon's conversations, Nixon ordered him to be fired. He then
accepted the Attorney General's resignation, and fired the Deputy Attor-
ney General, when they refused to give this order.'3 ' In the previously
mentioned case about contributions to the Nixon campaign, the Nixon-
appointed U.S. Attorney shut down the investigation after withdrawing
his subordinate's subpoena. Investigations of other prominent Republi-
cans were also halted by this U.S. Attorney.3 ' Indeed, Professor
Tuerkheimer has noted that as of the late 1970s, lawyers at Main Justice
had never charged a cabinet member with a crime.' In two of the three
20th Century instances in which an ad hoc investigation began to inves-
tigate a sitting president, the prosecutor has been fired.' 34 Moreover, in
the Teapot Dome and Watergate scandals, two instances when investiga-
tions reached the highest levels of government, prosecutors proceeded
with the investigation only because Congress placed intense pressure on
the administration.' This suggests that the government's ability to
prosecute human rights abuses committed or ordered by top officials,
their friends, or their foreign allies depends on the extent of Congres-
sional interest in the matter; if administration allies control Congress,
prosecution may never occur.
In sum, the American legal system is organized in a way that pro-
vides no guarantee that international obligations to prosecute will be
met. Individuals subject to the control of an administration's key politi-
cal officials have complete discretion. Therefore, when allegations of
human rights abuses implicate government officials, their friends, or for-
eign allies, these individuals will therefore have the incentives, and the
131. Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 611.
132. Id. at 607-08.
133. Id. at 613.
134. Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the Past
Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 497 (1998) [hereinafter History].
135. Tuerkheimer, supra note 97, at 612.
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capacity, to order inaction. Unable to file charges of their own, private
individuals have no way to circumvent inactive prosecutors. Thus, ful-
fillment of international obligations to prosecute is contingent on
political officials putting the interests of justice ahead of their own self
interest; such public spiritedness seems unlikely if that self interest is
sufficiently strong.
III. THE FOUR KEY FEATURES OF CIVIL LAW JUSTICE SYSTEMS
Criminal justice systems in civil law countries, such as Germany, It-
aly, France, and Spain, are structurally quite different from the American
system. It has been questioned whether this structural difference leads
most run-of-the-mill cases to be disposed of in a manner all that different
from the way they would be in the U.S.'36 However, it is unquestioned
that characteristic features of many civil law systems can, at least in the-
ory, affect how certain particularly significant cases are handled. 37 This
section seeks to elucidate the implications of these features on the han-
dling of alleged human rights crimes.
Examination of European civil law countries reveals that their insti-
tutions do not create the same systematic barriers to human rights
prosecutions that exist in the American system. Four characteristic fea-
tures of civil law justice systems make this so. They are: 1) prosecutorial
independence, 2) the absence of prosecutorial discretion, 3) opportuni-
ties for a crime victim to participate in criminal proceedings, and 4) an
active judicial role in pre-trial investigation of alleged crimes. Each of
these features, and their implications for human rights prosecutions, will
be examined in turn.
It should first be noted, though, that not all civil law justice systems
contain each of these four features. In fact, none of the countries-Spain,
France, Germany, and Italy---considered by this Note has a system con-
taining all of them.'3' Thus, in analyzing the abovementioned factors, the
goal is not to show that they are characteristic of a pure civil law justice
system, and that a pure civil law justice system is therefore better able to
handle alleged human rights violations than a pure common-law legal
system. Rather, it is to show that each feature individually should help
overcome potential barriers to the prosecution of human rights viola-
tions. Combinations of these features may be particularly helpful;
therefore their interrelationship will also be examined. However, the fo-
cus will be on identifying features of these justice systems that, in and of
136. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 8, at 279-83.
137. See id. at 279-80.
138. See infra notes 118-235 and accompanying text.
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themselves, make it less likely a government could prevent the prosecu-
tion of human rights abuses in the way that the American government
can.
A. Prosecutorial Independence
The status of the public prosecutor in many civil law countries
serves to facilitate prosecution of human rights offenses. While the civil
law public prosecutor often maintains some relation to the executive
branch,'39 he tends to be freer from its control than an American federal
prosecutor. As a result, an order not to prosecute would not necessarily
be effective.
There are several reasons why prosecutors in European civil law
countries are less subject to control by political officials. The first is
largely formalistic. In France and Italy, prosecutors are considered mag-
istrates, and hence part of the judicial branch. 40 Indeed, prosecutors and
judges in these countries often move back and forth between the two
jobs over the course of their careers.'4' In Germany as well, judges may
accept a prosecutorial post, then move back to judging, or vice versa.42
This nominal affiliation with the judiciary breeds a judicial outlook
amongst prosecutors, who like judges are guided by the values of objec-
tivity, independence, and impartiality.
43
The actual structure of the prosecutor's relationship with political of-
ficials varies widely across civil law countries; in many cases, that
139. REN9 DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 60
(Michael Kindred trans., La. St. Univ. Press, 1972) (1960) (on France); CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 91-92 (on Germany); Richard Vogler, Spain, in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, A WORLDWIDE STUDY 371 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 1999) [hereinafter WORLD-
WIDE STUDY]; but see Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance,
48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 236 (2002) (noting complete absence of executive branch control
over Italian prosecutors).
140. DAVID, supra note 139, at 59; Grande, supra note 139, at 236.
141. Grande, supra note 139, at 236; Robert Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French
Criminal Trials, 18 AM. J. COmp. L. 483,485 (1970).
142. David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Im-
plementation of a Reichsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1819 (1988). In Germany, the idea
that prosecutors are judicial officers is further reinforced for them by the historical origins of
that office. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the functions now performed by prosecutors
were performed by the inquisitorial judge, who investigated alleged or suspected crime and
then adjudicated on the basis of his own investigation. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY,
supra note 8, at 90; Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting
Attorney in West Germany, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 508, 508 (1970). The functions were separated
on the initiative of the jurist Carl von Savigny, who served as Prussian Minister of Justice. He
felt that a separate prosecutor would promote efficiency and impartiality in adjudication. See
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 90.
143. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 510; see also John Henry Merryman, How Others Do
It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (1988).
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relationship is structured in ways that prevent executive branch officials
from impeding human rights prosecutions. Separation of prosecution
from the executive branch is most complete in Italy. There, prosecutors
are "entirely independent from the politically responsible Ministry of
Justice."'" This separation came about due to fear that crimes perpetrated
by politically powerful individuals would not be prosecuted if the execu-
tive could control prosecutorial activities. 4 1 Separation, therefore, leaves
the executive branch no control over decisions about investigating or
prosecuting any crime; this strongly increases the odds that legitimate
accusations will be pursued.
French and German prosecutors are not as free from control as their
Italian counterparts. In these nations, prosecutors are organized hierar-
chically under the direction of the Minister of Justice, a political
official. 46 In France, the Minister supervises an Attorney General for
each appellate district, who in turn supervises the prosecuting attorney of
each court of general jurisdiction. 47 In Germany, prosecution is organ-
ized state by state. Prosecutors report to the chief prosecutor of the
judicial district, who reports to the "Prosecutor General" of the state. He
in turn reports to the state Minister of Justice. 48 Federal prosecutors re-
port to the head of the federal prosecutor's office; he is in turn under the
authority of the Federal Minister of Justice.
49
These organizational systems permit the executive branch to issue
orders to prosecutors. For the most part, they are orders that German and
French prosecutors must heed. French prosecutors are required to argue
in writing any position ordered by their superiors.' ° However, the French
prosecutor is free to present his personal opinion when making oral ar-
guments.'' The German prosecutor too is obliged to follow directions,
including orders to prosecute or not prosecute an act.'52 Yet the German
144. Grande, supra note 139, at 240.
145. Id. Belief in the need for prosecutorial/executive separation was so strong that it
was enshrined in the Italian Constitution. Id.
146. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 91; DAVID, supra note 139, at
59-61.
147. Richard Frase, France, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 139. at 146 [hereinafter
France]. The prosecuting attorney will himself supervise a staff of prosecutors. Id.
148. Hans-Heiner Kuhne, Germany, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY 137, 141 (Christine Van den Wyngaert et al. eds., 1993); CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 91.
149. See Kuhne, supra note 148, at 141. Federal prosecutors have jurisdiction only over
subversive activities. See id.
150. DAVID, supra note 139, at 60-61.
151. Id.
152. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 511.
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prosecutor is bound not to follow instructions that are clearly contrary to
the law, which rigidly regulates performance of his duties."'53
Selection and promotion practices also help to insulate prosecutors
from political influence in many civil law countries. European prosecu-
tors are selected largely on the basis of competitive examinations. 1 4 In
France and Italy, they must pass the same competitive examinations as
judges.'55 In Spain, aspiring prosecutors take a slightly different exam.
German prosecutors, in contrast, are chosen from the pool of recent law
school graduates by the Minister of Justice. However, selections are
largely based on scores from an examination given to all prospective
lawyers.'" Promotion decisions are also largely free from political influ-
ence. Although French and German prosecutors are subject to transfer,
dismissal, or discipline for failure to follow orders, promotion decisions
are largely based on merit.'58 In Italy, prosecutorial promotions are based
on seniority."9
These hiring and promotion practices make civil law prosecutors less
receptive to influence from the executive branch, and hence less likely to
ignore human rights offenses committed by it, in several ways. Having
entered the profession by examination and not appointment, they are not
beholden to the executive for their positions. Moreover, they are not
more likely than average people to support the incumbent regime. Even
153. See id. While both French and German prosecutors operate under limited obliga-
tions to follow orders from political superiors, French prosecutors may, in practice, be more
able to disregard orders than their German counterparts. In Germany, "higher officials of the
prosecuting attorney's office are empowered to assume the duties of a subordinate at any time,
or to entrust them to another." Id. Thus, if a German prosecutor does not wish to follow a
directive, believing it to be against the law or just contrary to his personal convictions, it is
relatively easy and costless to assign the case to a prosecutor who thinks differently. This
prevents prosecutors from having to act against their convictions. Id. When a French prosecu-
tor declines to follow a directive, however, it is more difficult for his superiors to see that the
directive is carried out. This is because, so long as the prosecutor holds his office, "nobody
can serve as a substitute for him and act in his place." Vouin, supra note 141, at 487. Thus, to
ensure that an order is carried out, superiors would be forced to transfer or dismiss an intran-
sigent prosecutor. Id. In the human rights context, however, this is not likely to provide much
insulation from political influence. When his superiors do not believe that implementing an
order is important enough to dismiss a prosecutor, the prosecutor may be able to disregard the
order. Yet, when superiors feel strongly about a directive-as they are likely to with decisions
related to human rights prosecutions-a prosecutor would have to comply or face dismissal.
154. John Henry Merryman, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN ERUOPE AND LATIN AMERICA 104-5, (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter
CIVIL LAW TRADITION].
155. DAVID, supra note 139, at 61; Grande, supra note 139, at 236.
156. Vogler, supra note 139, at 371.
157. Frase & Weigend, supra note 10, at 320.
158. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 91; see also DAVID, supra note
139, at 60-61; Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 559-64.
159. Grande, supra note 139, at 236.
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in Germany, where Ministries of Justice play a role in selecting prosecu-
tors, the heavy emphasis on merit and the young age at which
prosecutors are selected reduce the effects that beholdenness or political
affiliation may have. Meritocracy or seniority-based promotion schemes
mean that prosecutors can act in accordance within their own view of the
law, and need not fear that angering the executive will endanger their
chances for advancement; they must only be sure that their actions do
not go so far as to subject them to discipline or dismissal.
In sum, West European civil law countries structure prosecuto-
rial/executive branch relations in ways that limit the latter's ability to
control when and how cases are brought. Italy, the extreme case, totally
separates prosecutors from the Ministry of Justice. The French, German,
and Spanish systems have characteristics that make prosecutors prone to
resist orders they consider improper. All of these features limit the ability
of political leaders to derail prosecutions for genocide, crimes against
humanity, or other internationally proscribed offenses.
B. The Principle of Compulsory Prosecution
The principle of compulsory prosecution also has the potential to
facilitate the investigation and punishment of human rights offenses.
This principle, which has been incorporated into the laws of many Euro-
pean civil law nations, holds at base that prosecutors must prosecute all
crimes about which they obtain sufficient evidence.' 60 It therefore places
the European civil law prosecutor in a position diametrically opposed to
that of his American counterpart, who has unfettered discretion about
whether and how to prosecute.
The principle has been studied extensively as it exists in Germany,
16
1
where it was introduced in the nineteenth century. 62 When the
prosecutorial power was separated from the judicial power and placed
under the Minister of Justice's control, it was feared that prosecutors
"could be subjected to political pressure to abuse [their] considerable
powers of prosecution and non prosecution."'' 63  The principle of
160. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 509.
161. See, e.g., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 91-1100; Frase &
Weigend, supra note 10, at 337-41; Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 8; Joachim Herrmann,
The German Prosecutor, in DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 16; Jescheck, supra note
142; John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
439 (1974) [hereinafter Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion].
162. Herrmann, supra note 161, at 17-18.
163. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 91. Proponents of compulsory
prosecution believed that in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions, criminal laws had been
used to selectively prosecute "opponents of the regime." Later partisans of the rule noted that
the Nazis made exceptions to it in order to stop members of their paramilitary organizations
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compulsory prosecution was developed as a response;" it provides the
prosecutor a basis to resist orders not to prosecute crimes the executive
would like ignored. 65 This principle remains enshrined in the German
statue regulating criminal procedure. 1
66
The compulsory prosecution principle imposes several related obli-
gations; these limit the ways in which the political preferences of
prosecutors or their superiors can affect enforcement of the law. On the
most basic level, prosecutors must bring charges when they possess suf-
ficient evidence to obtain a conviction. 67 Yet, in doing so, their discretion
is also restricted. They must present the court with evidence regarding
the entire criminal transaction; they cannot select specific elements of it
to prosecute. 68 Thus, the principle leaves no room for political prefer-
ences to influence the scope of the prosecution. Additionally, once the
prosecutor files charges, he cannot withdraw them unilaterally. Only the
court can authorize discontinuance of a prosecution.'69 This prevents
charges. from being dropped for reasons that are not strictly legal. The
prosecutor's discretion is also limited even before he decides whether to
bring charges. The compulsory prosecution principle prevents him from
deciding whether to institute an investigation, or whether and how to
continue an investigation, on any basis other than the facts.7 Thus, the
principle also limits political influence over whether and how potentially
incriminating facts are obtained.1
from being prosecuted. Glen Schram, The Obligation to Prosecute in West Germany, 17 AM.
J. COMP. L. 627, 627 (1969).
164. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 91.
165. Id.
166. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 509 (quoting Strafprozessordnung § 152 II [hereinafter
StPO]) ("[the prosecutor] is obliged, unless otherwise provided by law, to take action against
any activities which may be prosecuted and which are punishable in a court of law, to the
extent that sufficient factual particulars may be obtained."). In addition to this explicit statu-
tory basis, the principle is also considered to have a constitutional basis in Germany.
Compulsory prosecution is considered to be a requirement of Germany's equal protection
clause, and of the broader constitutional mandate that there be rule of law. Herrmann, supra
note 161, at 18.
167. Id. at 16.
168. Id. at 48.
169. Frase & Weigend, supra note 10, at 339.
170. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 509.
171. The compulsory prosecution principle also limits the discretion of the police.
Unless it did so, the police themselves would have discretion over whom to prosecute; they
could decide what offenses to report to prosecutors, and what evidence to pass along for the
prosecutor to use in determining whether to file charges. Moreover, if the police were subject
to executive branch control, their decisions might become a mechanism for political control of
law enforcement activity, a fear expressed by Germany's nineteenth century legal reformers.
Id. at 509-10. Therefore, German police are obligated to pursue all reports of criminal activity.
They must also inform the prosecutor of all such reports. Id. at 510. Moreover, while police
are technically affiliated with the Ministry of the Interior, they are "delegated" to the prosecu-
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Non-statutory corollaries to the compulsory prosecution rule limit
the use of legal and factual ambiguity as vehicles for exercising discre-
tion. The High Federal Court of Appeals has held that prosecutors must
follow the Court's interpretation of relevant laws in deciding whether a
given act is proscribed.' Thus, the prosecutor has no discretion not to
prosecute based on his own interpretation of the law, or an interpretation
imposed by political officials with ulterior motives. Moreover, common
practice is that in cases where the law is ambiguous, a charge will be
brought so that the ambiguity can be resolved by a court.'73 Doubts about
the sufficiency of evidence are handled similarly.' 4 Even if officials do
not follow the common practice of charging in borderline cases, the dis-
cretion is limited to situations where there is ambiguity in the facts or the
law.
75
There are some exceptions to the rule of compulsory prosecution.
Indeed, Professor Langbein-a prominent student of German criminal
procedure-has noted that the Germans do not "prosecute every jay-
walker."176 Under German law, "[t]he prosecution of petty infractions is
remitted to the duty-bound discretion of the prosecuting authorities.''
There is also some discretion about whether to prosecute misdemean-
ors.'78 While these exceptions have been much discussed in academic
literature, 7 1 they are of little relevance to the prosecution of human rights
violations; no crime that generates an international obligation to prose-
cute could be classified as a misdemeanor or petty offense.
The discretion permitted in charging "political offenses" and of-
fenses committed outside Germany is potentially more significant.
tor's office for the purposes of criminal investigation. Id. Thus, when investigating alleged
crimes, the investigative and reporting activities of the police are controlled by the prosecutor,
who can direct them in accordance with his own obligation to prosecute.
172. Herrmann, supra note 161, at 21-22.
173. Id. at 21.
174. Id. at 25 (noting that when evidence is of questionable sufficiency, charges will be
brought and the court will decide if it has enough facts to convict).
175. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 511.
176. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 92.
177. Id. at 93 (quoting Gesetz iiber Ordnungswidrigkeiten § 147 [hereinafter GUO]).
178. Id. at 98 (quoting StPO § 153.1). A prosecutor may decline to prosecute these
crimes "if the guilt of the actor would be regarded as minor (gering), and there is no public
interest in prosecuting." Id. However, the prosecutor may do so only if the court that would try
the case approves. Id. at 99.
179. See, e.g., id. at 92-100; Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 161, at
451-55; Herrmann, supra note 161, at 31-41; Jescheck, supra note 142, at 513-14.
180. The "political offenses" exception was created to prevent prosecution of visiting
East German dignitaries, which might otherwise have been compelled. Schram, supra note
163, at 627-29. Potential charges included subversive activities against West Germany, as well
as manslaughter or depravation of freedom-for having people trying to flee from East Ger-
many shot. West German law held that citizens of both Germanies were subject to the
provisions of its penal code. Id.
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These types of offenses need not be prosecuted if doing so creates a dan-
ger of "severe disadvantage" to Germany, or if "abstention is required by
other dominant public interests."'8 ' Authority to invoke these exceptions
is granted to the Federal Prosecutor General." 2 These exceptions may
significantly undermine the general principle's ability to guarantee
prosecution in situations where it is compelled by international law.
However, in at least some such situations, the exceptions cannot be in-
voked. Genocide, aggressive war, and preparation for aggressive war
must be prosecuted, regardless of where they are committed. 3
The principle of compulsory prosecution, as it exists in Germany,
should help to prevent political interference with prosecutions mandated
by international law. It compels prosecutors to investigate and charge
major crimes, including crimes that violate international law, except
when they are political crimes or are committed outside Germany. It
therefore requires prosecutors to disregard orders not to investigate or
prosecute most international law crimes about which there is evidence.
The principle of compulsory prosecution also exists in Spain and It-
aly. In both these countries, a prosecutor cannot decline to prosecute a
case when there is enough evidence to obtain a conviction.1'8 In Italy, this
means that before he can decline to prosecute, the prosecutor must ob-
tain a ruling from a judge saying he is unlikely to get a conviction.'85
There, the obligation also requires prosecutors to investigate all allega-
tions of criminal activity within six months of the time they are
reported. ' Moreover, like the Germans, the Italians imposed the com-
pulsory prosecution requirement because "the lack of discretion on the
side of the prosecutor would avoid future unfair treatment of crimes per-
petrated by the political regime.' 87 Thus, Italy too adopted the rule in
order to avoid interference with the type of prosecution likely to be
sparked by allegations of human rights violations.'88
181. Id. at 629.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 629 n.9; Herrmann, supra note 161, at 51 n. 159.
184. Thomas Weigend, Criminal Procedure: Comparative Aspects, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 444,448 (2002).
185. Grande, supra note 139, at 233.
186. Id. at 232-33. The Spanish impose the obligation to prosecute by statute, whereas
in Italy, as in Germany, the obligation is constitutional. Id. (citing COST. art. 112) (Italy);
L.E.CRIM. art. 105 (Spain).
187. Grande, supra note 139, at 240.
188. Unlike Germany, Italy, and Spain, France has not formally adopted the principle of
compulsory prosecution. Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 612 (noting that Article 40
of the French Code of Criminal Procedure grants prosecutors discretion not to bring charges
even in cases of provable guilt). However, in France prosecutorial discretion is more restrained
than in the U.S. Id. at 611. While the French prosecutor enjoys broad discretion before a
charge is brought, he can drop the charge only with a magistrate's approval. Id. at 613. Ac-
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While it therefore appears that German, Italian, and Spanish prose-
cutors can exercise almost no discretion when handling major crimes, it
has been argued that, with respect to many such crimes, this is not really
the case. 8 9 In a seminal article, Goldstein and Marcus identified several
ways in which prosecutors ostensibly bound by the compulsory prosecu-
tion principle in fact exercise discretion.' 9 Determinations about the
sufficiency of evidence, they argue, are one mechanism prosecutors
commonly exploit.'9' In Italy, for instance, the prosecutor may conclude
that evidence against the accused is insufficient when additional investi-
gation could turn up facts sufficient to support a charge.' 92 Or, the
prosecutor may make a determination of evidentiary sufficiency that
turns on "assessments of credibility."' 93 According to Goldstein and Mar-
cus, German prosecutors also use these methods for injecting discretion
into their decisions.' 94 Moreover, they argue that when a German prose-
cutor prefers not to bring a case, he unquestioningly accepts police
assertions that further investigation will be fruitless.' 95 Goldstein and
Marcus also express skepticism at German prosecutors' assertions that
they do not reclassify serious crimes as misdemeanors so that they can
legally decline to prosecute. 196
It is unclear how many of these unofficial avenues for discretion
could realistically be employed in a human rights case. Given the nature
of the allegation, there would be little possibility of a prosecutor reclassi-
fying the actions as a misdemeanor. Moreover, given the attention such a
case would likely receive, unquestioning deferral to a police assessment
of the evidence, especially one of dubious validity, also seems unlikely.
cording to Professor Frase, the tendency toward career-long service amongst French prosecu-
tors creates a de facto curb on their discretion. Without high turnover, French prosecutors
learn and consistently apply policies governing when to prosecute; these in essence become
the contours of the offense's definition. Id. at 616. The victim's power to file charges provides
another de facto check on discretion. If meritorious charges are going to be brought anyway,
the prosecutor may feel pressure to bring them himself. Id. at 670.
While prosecutorial discretion in France may be more limited than in the U. S., it may
not be restricted in ways that prevent political interference with human fights prosecution. De
facto limits on discretion generated by a routine application of standards and pressure gener-
ated by privately brought charges could be easily overridden in a case important enough to
attract the attention of top political officials. Limits on dropping charges would be relevant
only if charges were brought in the first place. Thus, the French prosecutor's ability to prose-
cute alleged human rights abuses would seem to be subject to the same limitations as an
American prosecutor's.
189. See Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 8.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 271-75.
192. Id. at 271.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 275.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 272-73.
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The prosecutor's assessment of the evidence, however, might provide an
avenue by which discretion could realistically be exercised. It is true that
the attention such a case would receive increases pressure for the prose-
cutor not to drop the matter when it is clear that evidence exists. Yet,
practice suggests that this may be insufficient to ensure adherence to the
rule of compulsory prosecution. Schram has observed that in West Ger-
many, before the political crimes exception was enacted, prosecutors
declined to prosecute an East German radio broadcaster on evidentiary
grounds when the government strongly desired not to have accusations
brought.' 97 When officials from Argentina's repressive military dictator-
ships became the subject of a case in Spain for genocide, terrorism, and
crimes against humanity -a case the Spanish government did not want
to go forward'9 -prosecutors declined to bring charges, alleging, among
other things, insufficiency of jurisdictional facts the court later found
clearly sufficient.' 99 These incidents suggest that, in and of itself, the
principle of compulsory prosecution may not be sufficient to prevent
political interference with human rights prosecutions.
In sum, many civil law countries attempt to ensure that the law will
protect all people by mandating prosecution when sufficient evidence is
available. Although the rule was created largely to prevent government
officials from ordering prosecutors not to prosecute crimes that the gov-
ernment would like to go unpunished, the rule's ability to accomplish
this by itself, especially in the context of human rights cases, is debat-
able. In some situations, other factors may be necessary to ensure that
human rights abuses are prosecuted
C. Opportunities for Victims to Participate
in the Criminal Process
Unlike in America, complainants in Spain, France, Germany and It-
aly have formal opportunities to participate in the criminal process.
Frequently, opportunities for participation place the complainant in a
position to circumvent the prosecutor's decision not to pursue a case.
Thus, in some civil law countries, the complainant's role in proceedings
can help to ensure that international law-based obligations to prosecute
are met.
197. Schram, supra note 163, at 630.
198. Email from Juan E. Garcfs y Ram6n, Chief Attorney for the Private Plaintiffs in the
Spanish case against Augusto Pinochet and others (Dec. 27, 2002, 02:49 PST) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Garcis E-mail].
199. Pinochet case, SAN, Sept. 15, 1998 (Sumario 19/97-J, Auto, Juzgado Central de
Instrucci6n num. 6), at http://www.chip.cl/derechos/images/1509.rtf (last visited Nov. 13,
2003).
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In many nations, crime victims have the right to appeal from prose-
cutorial decisions. German crime victims, for example, have two
opportunities to do so. First, if the prosecutor declines to pursue an alle-
gation, the victim may file a formal request that investigative
proceedings be initiated.06 Second, if the prosecutor does not comply, or
if, at the end of the investigation, the prosecutor does not file charges,
the victim may file a "departmental complaint" with the prosecutor gen-
eral.0 ' If the prosecutor general rejects the complaint, the victim may
appeal to the state court of appeals. Should that court agree with the vic-
tim, it will order the prosecutor to file charges. 2 To facilitate activation
of this review process, German law requires the prosecutor to notify the
victim if charges will not be brought. The prosecutor must also provide
explanation of his decision.203
These procedures provide the victim, through the courts, with ability
to control the prosecutor's adherence to the compulsory prosecution
principle.204 Politically motivated decisions not to adhere strictly to the
principle in a human rights case could be reviewed on the victim's initia-
tive, and reversed. Appeal all the way to the court of appeals rarely
occurs, however. There is strong disincentive to bring such an appeal, as
the complainant may be liable for court costs if it is rejected 205 But the
mere potential for appeal makes prosecutors reluctant not to pursue
206cases.
200. Herrmann, supra note 161, at 26; Jescheck, supra note 142, at 512.
201. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 512. This "departmental complaint" rarely results in
charges being brought. However when the victim accompanies the complaint with new evi-
dence, it can serve as an effective mechanism for getting the case reopened. Herrmann, supra
note 161, at 27.
202. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 512. Appeal to this court is proper only when the
prosecutor declines to bring charges that the victim cannot bring himself. Herrmann, supra
note 161, at 30. However, few of the likely charges in a human rights case can be brought by a
victim in Germany. The charges that a victim can file are: "trespass, libel and slander, viola-
tion of mail secrecy, destruction of property, patent and trademark violations, unfair
competition, assault and battery, and negligent wounding," Frase & Weigend, supra note 10, at
350.
203. Weigend, supra note 184, at 448.
204. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 512.
205. Herrmann, supra note 161, at 27.
206. Id. at 26. Another procedure permits any German citizen to challenge decisions not
to prosecute. A person who believes prosecution should have gone forward may file an admin-
istrative complaint with the immediate superior of the prosecutor who declined to act; it
alleges "neglect of duty" on the prosecutor's part. Jescheck, supra note 142, at 512. If the
official to whom the complaint is addressed fails to act, the citizen can complain to his supe-
rior, and so forth, so that the final complaint will be addressed to the Ministry of Justice. Id.
Although Jescheck notes that these complaints receive immediate and thorough responses, he
also observes their nickname: "'wastepaper basket' complaint[s]." Id. Indeed, this nickname is
likely to be particularly apt in the context of a human rights case, where the decision not to
prosecute was likely taken by the Ministry of Justice itself.
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France and Italy too, allow for appeal of the prosecutor's decision
not to pursue a case. In France, this includes the right to appeal a deci-
sion not to prosecute, and the right to appeal a court order dropping
charges if the prosecutor procures one.0 7 Although Frase observes that
such appeals rarely occur in France, he speculates this is because victims
may not want to delay compensation conditioned on final resolution of
the case.2° As politically motivated decisions not to prosecute human
rights abuses are not likely to be conditioned on payment of restitution,
this deterrent to the pursuit of review is unlikely to be relevant in the
human rights context. In Italy, where the decision not to prosecute must
be approved by a judge, the victim is allowed to participate in this de-
termination.2°9 The victim can ask the judge to order additional
investigation or indictment of the accused, regardless of the public
prosecutor's position.10
Ability to obtain review of decisions not to prosecute gives victims
of human rights abuses a powerful tool for pushing forward cases the
government does not want to prosecute. Once an investigation has been
initiated or charges have been filed, the victim's right to join the pro-
ceedings as a party in many civil law countries increases the odds that
the case will be fully and effectively prosecuted. This right typically
arises from the victim's request for damages, which is handled in the
same proceeding as the criminal charges. 2 ' Indeed, in Spain, Germany,
and Italy, a claim for damages cannot go forward in criminal court unless
the criminal case does as well. 2 2 Thus, victims have strong incentives to
demonstrate the defendant's guilt.
The right to participate as a party encompasses several related rights,
each of which helps ensure that meritorious accusations are fully pur-
sued. In France, victims have the right to participate in the pre-trial
proceedings conducted by the investigating magistrate; 213 they have the
right to be notified of the magistrate's orders, to ask that the magistrate
hear the testimony of experts, or to request that the magistrate take other
investigative steps.2 4 This helps to ensure that the pre-trial investigation
will be conducted with vigor, regardless of the prosecutor's-or the gov-
ernment's-desires. At trial, the victim may propose witnesses, examine
witnesses proposed by other parties, file briefs, and make a closing ar-
207. Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 613, 618.
208. Id. at 623.
209. Grande, supra note 139, at 234.
210. Id.
211. Weigend, supra note 184, at 449.
212. Id.
213. These proceedings are discussed at more length in Part Ill.D, infra.
214. Vouin, supra note 141, at 494.
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gument." The victim can also appeal an adverse judgment.2 6 In Ger-
many, where the victim of a personal crime becomes an "auxiliary
prosecutor," this status comes with the right to question witnesses at
trial, propose evidence, and appeal an adverse judgment.21 ' He also has a
right to assistance of counsel and the right to inspect the prosecutor's
case-file .2 " These participatory rights make it more likely that charges
will be vigorously prosecuted at trial. Thus, in human rights cases, they
make it more likely a nation will fulfill its international obligations to do
justice.
Perhaps the most sweeping form of participation granted to victims
is the right to bring charges on their own. French and Spanish crime vic-
tims have this right, while Italian victims do not.219 Only the victims of
certain minor crimes may file charges in Germany.22°
The victim of a major crime in France may bypass the prosecutor
and file a complaint directly with the investigating magistrate.22 ' When
he does, he is in the same position as if he had joined a proceeding initi-
ated by a prosecutor's complaint.2  Although the primary purpose of
initiating proceedings is generally to seek damages,223 the victim need
224not claim money damages to do so. Moreover, the victim may request
investigation of all suspects, not just those from whom he has requested
damages. 5
The French crime victim's ability to start the judicial process himself
provides a powerful tool for circumventing government mandated prose-
cutorial inaction. Professor Frase argues that it also pressures
prosecutors to file complaints when they know the case will be opened
215. Id.
216. See id. at 491.
217. Frase & Weigend, supra note 10, at 350.
218. Id. All of these participatory rights also accrue to the victim whenever the prosecu-
tion was the result of an order by the Court of Appeals. See id.
219. See infra notes 200-215 and accompanying text.
220. See Frase & Weigend, supra note 10, at 350. Under German law, victims are gener-
ally not allowed to bring criminal charges. Indeed, the possibility of private prosecution was
considered and explicitly rejected by nineteenth century reformers as creating proceedings that
were too partisan for German taste. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY, supra note 8, at 90.
While private prosecution is allowed today for some minor offenses, assault and battery are
the only such offenses that involve physical harm intentionally inflicted upon a person. Frase
& Weigend, supra note 10, at 351. Given that re-categorization of human rights abuses as
"assault and battery" would be the only way to bring a privately initiated human rights prose-
cution in Germany, this method for overcoming prosecutorial inaction is essentially precluded
in Germany.
221. Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 613, 669; Vouin, supra note 141, at 493.
222. Vouin, supra note 141, at 493-94.
223. See id. at 492.
224. Id.
225. Richard Frase, Introduction to THE FRENCH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 20 (G.
Kock & R. Frase trans., 1988) [hereinafter FRENCH SYSTEM].
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216anyway, although in a human rights case that is potentially embarrass-
ing to the government, it seems unlikely that this pressure alone would
suffice. Despite its benefits, the private complaint is rarely used by crime
victims, and might not be used even in the human rights context; this is
due to the various costs and risks associated with it. Before filing a com-
plaint, victims are often asked to post a bond. If they lose, they may be
held liable for court costs and attorney's fees, which the bond can be
used to satisfy.227 This means that victims need resources available to
even initiate legal action, and face financial risk in doing so. The cost
and logistical difficulty private parties face in gathering evidence to pre-
sent the court also limits the usefulness of private criminal complaints.
Thus, the effectiveness of private complaints may be dependent on hav-
ing an active investigating magistrate who will employ state resources to
help gather incriminating evidence. 228
One peculiar feature of French law may remove some obstacles to
effective use of the private criminal complaint. Relaxed standing re-
quirements permit associations to prosecute people who harm their
members. 9 Some groups are granted standing explicitly by statute. They
include professional associations and family associations 230 These
groups would be more likely to have the resources to post bond and to
gather the facts needed to start a judicial inquiry. Concerns about exces-
sive prosecution by associations have prompted some judicial backlash
against these complaints. 3' Nonetheless, if members of one of these as-
sociations become victims of an internationally proscribed crime,
associational complaints could overcome prosecutorial inaction.
The right to bring charges neglected by the prosecutor takes its most
expansive form in Spain. 232 As in France, victims can file criminal and
civil complaints directly with an investigating magistrate; if he accepts
• .. .. 233
them he becomes responsible for the investigation. The victim can then
request acts of proof, submit comments on the case-file, and request in-
dictments.3 Yet unlike in France, the right to bring charges is afforded
226. Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 670.
227. FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 225, at 20-21.
228. Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 669-70.
229. GERMANY: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 8, at 88 n.2; Weigend, supra note
184, at 449; Vouin, supra note 141, at 495.
230. Vouin, supra note 141 at 495.
231. Id. at 495-96.
232. Weigend, supra note 184, at 449.
233. Vogler, supra note 139, at 363.
234. Id. at 383-86. On requests for acts of proof, see id. at 385. For comments on the
case file, see id. at 386. On requests for indictment-and specific charges-see id. at 386-87.
The ability of private citizens to bring criminal charges is considered so important that it is
constitutionally guaranteed. C.f. art. 125.
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not just to the victim or groups to which the victim belongs, but to every
citizen.235 However, despite the alleged value placed on victim participa-
tion by Spanish law, privately initiated complaints are rare there, as in
France, a fact that Weigend attributes to the difficulty of preparing a
criminal case without the resources of the state.236
Thus, many civil law legal systems are set up in ways that give crime
victims the ability overcome prosecutorial inaction. To the extent that
they work, they should facilitate the prosecution of human rights abuses.
Yet German appeals from decisions not to prosecute can be effective
only if the prosecutor ordered to go forward does so zealously-which
he may not given his initial decision not to prosecute-or if the victim
joins the proceedings and has the resources to be effective. It has been
hypothesized that the effect of French and Spanish rules allowing vic-
tims to join proceedings, and to initiate them, will be limited by the same
constraints.237 In Spain, however, in Pinochet's case, the victims' ability
to file complaints overcame the prosecutor's government-directed refusal
to investigate the charges. 38 This suggests that giving victims the ability
to file charges, or to otherwise participate in criminal proceedings, may
be effective at facilitating prosecution of human rights abuses.
D. Judicial Control Over Pre- Trial Investigation
For the purposes of human rights prosecution, the active role of
judges is one more crucial feature of many civil law justice systems.
Specifically, active judicial supervision of pre-trial investigation provides
another avenue by which political opposition to prosecution can be cir-
cumvented. This type of control has been identified as a hallmark of
"inquisitorial" justice.239 It therefore suggests that the inquisitorial judi-
cial model often associated with civil law systems itself facilitates the
prosecution of human rights abuses, at least at the pre-trial stage.
In the "Napoleonic pre-trial model,"24° judicial investigation is the
first stage in criminal proceedings that concern a major crime.14 ' It is
conducted by an investigating magistrate, a member of judiciary not
235. Weigend, supra note 184, at 449.
236. Id.
237. See supra note 222, and accompanying text.
238. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 14, at 318; Garcis E-mail, supra note 198.
239. Weigend, supra note 184, at 446.
240. Vogler, supra note 139, at 383.
241. Weigend, supra note 184, at 446. While no judicial investigation occurs when less
serious offenses are alleged, it would certainly occur in any case that engenders an interna-
tional obligation to prosecute. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 8, at 247; Vogler, supra note
139, at 383.
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controlled by the Ministry of Justice. 42 France and Spain still employ
this procedure. 4 ' Germany abolished the investigating magistrate's post
in 1975. Italy followed suit in 1988.'"
Inquisitorial theory's rationales for the investigating magistrate's role
relate closely to the types of obstacles a human rights case will likely
encounter. On a general level, the goal is to ensure that investigations are
conducted with integrity and impartiality.245 More concretely, the goal is
to facilitate direct judicial control over prosecutorial activities. More
over, unlike ex-post forms of supervision-such as the American
exclusionary rule-the French and Spanish procedure does not limit su-
pervision "to the cases that survive for trial. ' 247 Thus, the investigating
magistrate's reasons for existence are to check improper decisions in
cases the prosecutor does not want to try-such as improper decisions
not to prosecute-and to ensure impartiality in determinations about
who is investigated, or more importantly, who is not.
As the official in charge of investigation, the French or Spanish in-
vestigating magistrate has a number of powers. This magistrate can order
arrests and searches, interrogate suspects and other witnesses, inspect the
crime scene, appoint experts, or take any other relevant investigative
step; he may do so whether or not the prosecutor, or another party, pro-
posed the step.248 The magistrate is assisted by "judicial police," who are
under his control.49 In practice, they perform much of the investigative
work.
250
In France and Spain, responsibility for charging offenses is also left
to the investigating magistrate. This magistrate determines when the in-
vestigation is complete and whether any charges will be filed.5 Charges
filed by a Spanish magistrate are sent directly for trial.252 Those recom-
mended by a French magistrate are sent to a panel of other judges for
242. Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 666-67 (on France); Vogler, supra note
139, at 383 (on Spain). The investigating magistrate is not the same judge who will hear the
case if it goes to trial. Vogler, supra note 139, at 373; see also, France, supra note 147, at 147.
243. Vogler, supra note 139, at 383.
244. Id.
245. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 8, at 247-48.
246. Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 667.
247. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 8, at 247.
248. Id.; Vogler, supra note 139, at 386. As the investigating magistrate goes through
these steps, he compiles the results in a dossier. If the case goes to trial, this dossier will be
given to the trial judge, who will use it to help structure the trial. Some information in the
dossier is also admissible as evidence at the trial. Id.
249. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 8, at 247.
250. Id. at 248.
251. Id. at 247. If charges will be filed, the magistrate also determines their number and
severity. Id.; see also Vogler, supra note 139, at 383-85.
252. Vogler, supra note 139, at 383-85.
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review.253 However, this panel almost always approves the investigating
magistrate's decision.5 4
The institution of the investigating magistrate therefore strips prose-
cutors and their superiors of control over even minor details of pre-trial
proceedings, facilitating prosecutions opposed by the government. Not
only are charging decisions given to someone independent from the gov-
ernment, so too are routine decisions about how to investigate. Thus,
political officials cannot affect the outcome by influencing the investiga-
tive process. Moreover, the French and Spanish procedure gives control
over the investigation's particulars to somebody bound by law to exam-
ine "all relevant avenues of inquiry," regardless of where they lead.
2 5
Because the investigating magistrate has police who report to him and
not to a ministry, the diligence with which investigations are carried out
also cannot be influenced by the government. In sum, because of his
powers and duties, the French or Spanish investigating magistrate may
be particularly able to facilitate prosecution of human rights abuses.
Italy has attempted to retain judicial control of pre-trial activities
while eliminating the investigating magistrate. This is accomplished
through judicial review, which takes place when the prosecutor decides
whether to recommend filing charges. Regardless of what his recom-
mendation is, it must be approved by a judge; thus, even decisions not to
charge receive judicial review. 216 The judge may grant permission not to
prosecute only if the evidence appears insufficient to obtain a convic-
tion.5 7 If the judge is not sure this is the case, he can order further
investigation, or mandate that charges be brought.258 In deciding whether
charges should be brought, the judge is not bound by the evidence pre-
sented by the parties; the judge may call witnesses and procure his own
259experts. In conjunction, these rules provide for extensive judicial re-
view of prosecutorial decisions, and transfer some control over
investigation to the judge. However, because the Italian prosecutor is
fully separated from the government, they only marginally increase the
independence with which investigation will be carried out.
While pre-trial proceedings in France, Spain, and Italy are structured
to give judges control over investigation and charging, Goldstein and
Marcus question whether they really exercise control. Particularly, they
suggest, because investigating magistrates investigate only the most
253. France, supra note 147, at 147.
254. Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 668.
255. Vogler, supra note 139, at 384.
256. Grande, supra note 139, at 233.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 234.
259. Id. at 258.
Fall 2003]
Michigan Journal of International Law
serious crimes, prosecutors will classify crimes as less severe so as to
avoid giving a magistrate control of the investigation.2 60 They also
suggest that, in practice, magistrates will provide the police with little• • 261
supervision. Yet in cases involving any crime that might be
internationally proscribed, practice is likely to be closer to the theoretical
model previously described. Goldstein and Marcus have observed that
where a crime is complex, serious, or controversial, under-classifying to
avoid review by the investigating magistrate is difficult and rare.262
Moreover, if the victim can file a complaint with the investigating• . 261
magistrate, any attempt to under-classify could be circumvented. In a
controversial or major case, police discretion is also likely to be more
limited, as the judge will likely supervise their conduct more actively.
Yet more importantly, while absence of supervision may create police
discretion, it does not necessarily create possibilities for improper
government influence; even without supervision, this will not occur so
long as police are under judicial-not executive branch--control.
Goldstein and Marcus' doubts about the efficacy of judicial involvement
in pre-trial proceedings therefore seem inapplicable in the context of a
human rights case.
The transfer of control over pre-trial decisions from prosecutors and
police to judges should limit the extent to which a government can ob-
struct human rights prosecution. This transfer gives an independent
judge control over charging; the institution of the investigating magis-
trate also gives an independent official control over the investigation's
details. While the efficacy of this procedure likely depends on the magis-
trate's impartiality and initiative, it should facilitate the prosecution of
human rights cases.
E. Conclusion
The civil law justice systems of Spain, France, Italy, and Germany
are marked by features that facilitate the prosecution of human rights
abuses-prosecutions a government's executive branch is not likely to
approve of. Although they come in countless variations, these features,
broadly speaking, can be categorized as: 1) prosecutorial independence,
2) absence of prosecutorial discretion, 3) opportunities for victims to
participate in proceedings, and 4) an active judicial role in investigation
and charging. These features all reduce the ability of a government's po-
litical leaders to interfere with a case.
260. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 8, at 250-51.
261. Id. at 249.
262. Id. at 252.
263. Id.
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All four countries examined make their prosecutors more independ-
ent from the executive branch than they are in the U.S. Thus, these
prosecutors should be less prone to having their activities restricted by
political officials. However, where prosecutors are independent only by
virtue of selection and promotion policies, and are not freed from hierar-
chical command, this independence may not be sufficient to prevent
interference with a high profile human rights case unless there are addi-
tional limits on political influence over case outcomes. In Italy, where
prosecutors are wholly independent members of the judiciary, insulation
from political control should be more complete. However, absent some
other feature, even complete independence provides no guarantee that
internationally compelled prosecutions will be brought, as prosecutors
could always be lazy or have political sympathy with the potential sus-
pect.
Elimination of prosecutorial discretion could also facilitate prosecu-
tion by preventing an interested government from ordering that a case be
dropped. Even where prosecution is compulsory, mechanisms exist for
injecting discretion into the process, although some that exist in many
cases do not exist in the human rights context. This suggests that a com-
pulsory prosecution rule may be most effective only in conjunction with
one of the other abovementioned features: prosecutors sufficiently inde-
pendent that they would not exploit opportunities for discretion, or
opportunities for a victim or judge to enforce the compulsory prosecu-
tion rule.
Giving victims a role in criminal proceedings facilitates prosecution
regardless of the prosecutor's obligations. This is because it provides
opportunities to circumvent the prosecutor entirely. While enabling vic-
tims to override prosecutorial inaction should make human rights cases
easier to get to trial, victims seeking to participate in the process often
face resource constraints. Therefore, this feature may be most able to
facilitate prosecution when groups with resources can bring charges, or
when an investigating magistrate can use state resources to elaborate a
case initiated by a victim.
An active judicial role in pre-trial decision-making can also override
prosecutorial inaction. When the judge controls proceedings, he can inves-
tigate when the prosecutor was ordered not to, and bring charges when the
prosecutor was ordered not to recommend them. As judges command state
resources, giving them a role may be a particularly useful mechanism for
ensuring that alleged human rights violations get thoroughly examined.
However, as judges cannot initiate cases, this mechanism can guarantee
prosecution only when other features of the justice system-like a com-
pulsory prosecution rule, a right to bring private criminal complaints, or
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truly independent public prosecutors-ensure that legitimate charges get
into court.
Thus, in sum, each of the abovementioned features of some civil law
justice systems should greatly decrease the odds that a government could
block prosecution of human rights abuses. The extent to which each fea-
ture can serve this goal, though, depends on the context, including the
case, the actors' dispositions, and the legal system's other features.
Nonetheless, the presence of each makes it somewhat more likely that a
country will fulfill its international obligation to prosecute crimes that
offend all of humanity.
IV. PROSECUTING PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN AMERICA: SPECIAL
PROCEDURES AND INDEPENDENT COUNSELS
At first glance, comparison of these civil law systems with the
American system suggests that far-reaching reform may be necessary for
the American system to ensure punishment of human rights violations.
After all, while each feature discussed in Part III should help prevent the
complete obstruction that is possible in the American system, they are
features that apply broadly within the systems marked by them.
For reasons unrelated to human rights prosecution, some authors
have suggested that America undertake system-wide reforms along civil
law lines. 64 Many have advocated that American jurisdictions adopt
guidelines that would limit prosecutorial discretion in most cases,2 65 and
it has been suggested that selection of prosecutors and judges in the
United States be made on a more meritocratic basis.26' However, others
have questioned whether reforms modeled on the civil law tradition are
feasible in the American system.267 Professor Pizzi, for instance, has as-
serted that features of civil law systems like obligations to prosecute or
judicial review of charging decisions stem from a particular cultural un-
264. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 8, at 194-97 (arguing, in particular, for adoption of a
compulsory prosecution rule modeled after Germany's).
265. KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY, 189-90
(1969); Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 611-16; James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint
of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981); see also Pizzi, supra note 8, at 1363
(discussing prominent advocates of guidelines).
266. Frase, Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 565.
267. Pizzi, supra note 8, at 1372-73; see also Thomas Weigend, Continental Cures for
American Ailments: European Criminal Procedure as a Model for Law Reform, in 2 CRIME
AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 381 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry, eds.,
1980); Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing
to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 524-29 (1980); see gen-
erally Miran Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84
YALE L.J. 480 (1975).
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derstanding of the judicial process; it would therefore be difficult, he
argues, to import features of civil law systems into a judicial process
with different underlying cultural bases.268 Yet others have argued persua-
sively that there is no significant "legal culture gap" between Europe and
America, as can be seen from the systems' many shared institutions.69
Pizzi and others have also advanced arguments premised on the no-
tion of balance. Given the interrelationship between aspects of a legal
system, they argue, it is difficult to change one or two aspects of the sys-
tem alone; importing some aspects of a system into the body of another
leaves a system with institutions that are misaligned, and unable to func-
tion together. ° Yet the extensive procedural variety within the European
and American systems casts doubt on the notion that all of a system's
institutions are so inextricably linked. For instance, Prof. Pizzi asserts
that prosecutorial discretion in the United States is tightly intertwined
with "the American political tradition, in which prosecutors are local
officials who answer to the voters. 27' Yet not all states have locally
elected prosecutors. 72 The federal system, moreover, has prosecutors
appointed by a President sitting far from the cities where they work, and
who was elected largely due to positions on issues unrelated to criminal
273
justice. In most ordinary cases, the American system functions
smoothly, even in jurisdictions where prosecutors are not elected or po-
litically accountable.7
Yet more importantly, even if Pizzi and others are correct in assum-
ing that parts of a judicial system are so interrelated that none can be
altered without throwing the whole enterprise out of balance, that does
not mean that the balance a system achieves contemplates every case.
268. Pizzi, supra note 8, at 1372-73.
269. Abraham Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American
Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1020 (1974) (noting convergence in European
and American legal culture); Merryman, supra note 143, at 1865-76 (noting that the French
and German systems have undergone significant convergence in the post-war era, and that
newer processes make French and German judges more like American judges); Cynthia
Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in France: The Conseil Constitu-
tional Since 1971, 63 TUL. L. REV. 265, 266 (1988) (noting that a "revolutionary" 1971
decision of the Constitutional Court has produced a significant change in the political culture
underlying the French judicial system).
270. Pizzi, supra note 8, at 1373.
271. Id.
272. Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory
Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 492 n.23 (1988) (noting that 45 states have elected dis-
trict attorneys).
273. See William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505,542 (2001).
274. See, e.g., Green, supra note 272, at 492 n.23 (arguing that in ordinary cases, the
American system produces results that are more equitable in jurisdictions that do not have
elected prosecutors).
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For instance, the combination of political controls over prosecutors, jury
trials, and prosecutorial discretion-all elements of the American bal-
ance outlined by Pizzi27--did not prevent dozens of African Americans
in the small, largely white town of Tulia, Texas, from being convicted of
drug offenses they did not commit, all based on the uncorroborated tes-
timony of an itinerant white police officer accused of racism.276 Nor did
that balance prevent notorious KKK murders from going unprosecuted
throughout the South during the civil rights era.277 Thus, the logic that
some say counsels against broad adoption of individual civil law institu-
tions provides no reason not to employ such institutions in certain
extraordinary scenarios. This, of course, raises the question of whether
system wide reforms are really necessary to resolve the quandary out-
lined in part II, or whether smaller, situation-specific reforms are feasible
and up to the task. Fortunately, America's own experience with prosecu-
tion of government wrongdoing suggests the latter.
The American system has handled official misfeasance through pro-
cedures applicable only to this particular type of behavior. Passed in
1978, the Ethics in Government Act278 took responsibility for investigat-
ing the most serious government scandals away from the Department of
Justice. Instead, a judicially appointed independent counsel had respon-
sibility for these investigations .2 9 The independent counsel system,
however, is no longer; relevant statutory provisions lapsed when Con-
gress failed to renew them in 1999.280
For cases of official misfeasance, the Ethics in Government Act cre-
ated a new prosecutorial framework marked by features found in civil
law systems. First, it created a prosecutorial office at least somewhat
independent of the executive branch.2 1' Additionally, it attempted to con-
trol official discretion.2  Provisions in the independent counsel statute
when it lapsed also gave judges a very modest role in supervising pre-
trial prosecutorial activities.28 Thus, the independent counsel procedure
275. Pizzi, supra note 8, at 1373.
276. Lee Hockstader, 12 Free During Appeal of Dubious Convictions, SEATTLE TIMES,
June 17, 2003, atA4.
277. Michal R. Belknap, The Vindication of Burke Marshall: The Southern Legal System
and the Anti-Civil-Rights Violence of the 1960s, 33 EMORY L.J. 93, 93 (1984).
278. The Ethics in Government Act, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat 1824 (1978).
279. Abraham Dash, The Office of Independent Counsel and the Fatal Flaw: "They are
Left to Twist in the Wind", 60 Mo. L. REV. 26, 26-30 (2001).
280. Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the Wrong Lessons From History: Why There Must
be an Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1 (2000).
281. Cass Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2272
(1998).
282. Id. at 2272-3.
283. Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MIcH. L.
REV. 601,686-87 (1998).
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is an example of how features found in some civil law systems can be
incorporated into an American-style system on a limited basis to solve
problems related to prosecution of government officials.
That the independent counsel statute employs mechanisms like those
discussed in Part III is not surprising, given its origins; it was in fact mo-
tivated by problems similar to those a human rights case would likely
face. Its impetus was the "Saturday Night Massacre," when President
Nixon ordered the firing of Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox, forcing
intermediate officials who would not fire Cox to resign."' Almost imme-
diately after this happened, Congress began debating proposals about
how to prevent another such executive coup-de-force.28 ' Those involved
in the debate quickly concluded that the answer was some form of spe-
cial prosecutor, one who would only handle allegations against top
federal officials. 286
The law that finally passed created the independent counsel. 287 Such
a prosecutor's mission was to investigate specific allegations of criminal
conduct levied against top executive branch officials, including the
President, Vice-President, cabinet secretaries, agency heads, and many
281others. When informed by the Attorney General that an independent
counsel was needed, a special panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals would
appoint one, 289 and define precisely what he should investigate. 290 Once
appointed, the independent counsel "exercise[d] all investigative and
prosecutorial" powers held by the Attorney General or his subordinates,
and was not subject to direction by them.2 9 The Attorney General re-
tained the authority to terminate a counsel for good cause or
"extraordinary impropriety.' 292 However, the three-judge panel could
terminate whenever it felt transfer of the case to the Justice Department
was appropriate.2 93 These provisions gave independent counsels almost
total independence.294
284. Id. at 608.
285. Id. at 609.
286. Id. at 609-13.
287. Id. at 625-26. Between 1978 and 1982, this position was labeled "special prosecu-
tor." In 1982, the name was changed to "independent counsel" to better reflect its holder's
independence from the Justice Department. Id. at 692.
288. Id. at 625.
289. Id. at 625-26.
290. Id. at 626.
291. Sunstein, supra note 281, at 2272-73.
292. Gormley, supra note 283, at 626 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994)). The statute's
original language granted power to remove only for incapacity and "extraordinary impropri-
ety." Language referring to "good cause" was added during subsequent reauthorization. See
Sunstein, supra note 281, at 2274.
293. Gormley, supra note 283, at 626.
294. Id. at 625.
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The Ethics in Government Act did not leave requests for a counsel's
appointment to the Attorney General's unchecked discretion. When the
Attorney General received "specific information" about criminal conduct
by a covered official, the Justice Department would have to conduct a
preliminary investigation;295 it could decline to investigate only based on
an accusation's specificity or credibility.296 After investigating for ninety
days, the Attorney General could close the case if he determined that the
allegation was "so unsubstantiated as not to warrant further investiga-
tion. 297 Otherwise, the Attorney General had to request appointment of
an independent counsel.29' Although this triggering mechanism sharply
limited the amount of discretion left to the Attorney General, it did not
wholly eliminate his discretion. Determinations about "credibility" and
the extent of "substantiation" could in truth be made on the basis of
other considerations; one study suggested that-at least during the
Reagan administration-they were. 299 Nevertheless, the goal, and sub-
stantial result of these provisions, was limited discretion in triggering the
statute.
Once the statute was triggered and an independent counsel ap-
pointed, the three-judge panel maintained a limited supervisory role.
Under provisions added the last time the independent counsel statute was
reauthorized, it would have to periodically evaluate each investigation.00
This review was primarily to see if further investigation was really
needed.'O Nonetheless, this provision gave the court some authority over
investigation of allegations against high-level officials.3 °2
This experience with independent counsels shows that it is possible
to create a prosecutorial framework incorporating features from civil law
systems, and employ the framework only in a limited number of pre-set
circumstances. Moreover, it shows that those features that facilitate
prosecution of government officials in civil law countries can be applied
in the American context to certain cases of government malfeasance.
Thus, a special set of prosecutorial procedures, designed along civil law
lines, may be a feasible way for the American system to guarantee hu-
295. Id. at 625 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 591).
296. History, supra note 134, at 510.
297. Gormley, supra note 283, at 625 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1994)).
298. Gormley, supra note 283, at 625.
299. History, supra note 134, at 509-10.
300. Gormley, supra note 283, at 686. Evaluations would take place after an investiga-
tion's second and fourth year, and every year thereafter.
301. Id. After all, with a completely independent prosecutor, it should be unnecessary to
review whether fruitful lines of investigation have been ignored.
302. The panel's review was necessarily limited in order to avoid potential separation of
powers problems, Id. at 686-87, which the Supreme Court warned might be a consequence of
too much direction by the three-judge panel. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1988).
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man rights cases the procedural treatment required under international
law. Indeed, a system of independent counsel investigations just for al-
leged human rights abuses appears to be a feasible option; in the U.S.,
for instance, something sufficiently similar to the old independent coun-
sel would have the advantage of pre-established constitutionality.
303
The independent counsel provisions, however, were allowed to lapse
because they grew unpopular. Independent counsel Kenneth Starr's in-
vestigation of President Clinton sparked strong outcry.' °4 In the debates
his investigation prompted, academics outlined several interrelated cri-
tiques of the independent counsel statute. First, some observed that the
triggering mechanism forced appointment of counsels to investigate ac-
tivities that, while criminal, were not particularly serious.0  Second, the
independent counsel provisions were said to incentivize zealotry, without
placing effective checks on the prosecutor.3 °6 The prosecutor was driven
to justify his existence by finding some criminal conduct; the prospect of
fame provided further motive to charge something. 7 In the face of these
incentives, the three-judge panel's periodic review was the only check,
and these reviews tended to be perfunctory.0 8 Third, the counsel's juris-
dictional flexibility allegedly compounded problems with excessive zeal
and investigation of trivial matters.O While the counsel could investigate
only charges mentioned in his jurisdictional charter, he could almost sin-
gle-handedly get the charter expanded to cover any criminal conduct
allegedly engaged in by his target.3 '0 This meant that an independent
303. Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (upholding constitutionality of the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act).
304. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 280, at 1 (criticizing "abuses" of the Independ-
ent Counsel's office by Kenneth Starr); Gormley, supra note 279, at 639 (noting the "uproar"
caused by the conduct of Kenneth Starr).
305. See, e.g., Gormley, supra note 283, at 643; Sunstein, supra note 281, at 2273-75.
As an example, both Gormnley and Sunstein cite the independent counsel investigation into
allegations former HUD Secretary Hentry Cisneros lied to the FBI about payments to a mis-
tress. Sunstein also cites investigations into alleged cocaine use by President Carter's chief of
staff and campaign manager, and an investigation into perjury allegations against then Assis-
tant Attorney General Theodore Olson. Gormley, supra note 283, at 643; Sunstein, supra note
281, at 2275. These arguably unnecessary independent counsel investigations were criticized
for having caused harm to their targets' reputations and great expense of public funds. See
Sunstein, supra note 281, at 2275, 2279-80.
306. See e.g., Sunstein, supra note 281, at 2279.
307. See id.
308. Gormley, supra note 283, at 686-89.
309. Id. at 659-69.
310. If the counsel came across information about criminal conduct by the target that
was not covered by the jurisdictional charter, he could inform the Attorney General and re-
quest permission to investigate the new unrelated matter. The Attorney General then had to
investigate for thirty days to see if an expansion of jurisdiction was warranted. Id. at 662. In
deciding, the Attorney General had to give "great weight to any recommendations of the inde-
pendent counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(2)(A)(2002). If the Attorney General decided to expand
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counsel with incentives to be zealous could expand his investigation al-
most at will, and investigate crimes of minimal gravity. This, some felt,
produced witch-hunts.'
Any proposal to incorporate elements of European justice systems
into the American system, to operate only in cases involving alleged hu-
man rights abuses, would have to respond to the perceived flaws of the
discarded independent counsel system. For a proposal to have these
cases handled by a prosecutor separated from the executive, this would
be particularly important. Yet, a system of independent counsels for alle-
gations of human rights abuse would not be subject to many of the
criticisms leveled at the old statute. If the counsel's jurisdiction were
limited ab initio to crimes which there is an international obligation to
prosecute, there would be no risk of costly, embarrassing investigations
into trivial criminal acts. This risk would be further alleviated if the
counsel were prohibited from redefining his jurisdiction to include
crimes unrelated to human rights. With these limits, the incentive to in-
vestigate and prosecute zealously would be less problematic; evidence of
behavior within the prosecutor's jurisdiction that turns up will necessar-
ily have been worth the cost. Incentives to prolong a fruitless
investigation could be countered with periodic judicial reviews, as under
the old independent counsel system. Thus, in the human rights context,
an independent counsel system could facilitate prosecution without gen-
erating the problems that prompted America to abandon its old system.
An independent counsel system, of course, is not the only way to
take features of European systems and employ them within the American
system exclusively in human rights cases. For instance, some scholars
312have advocated giving victims a greater role in the criminal process.
One proposal would permit the victim to seek judicial review of a deci-
sion not to prosecute; if the court ruled that the case had merit, the
victim would be allowed to prosecute it personally.3 3 Another proposal
would permit judicial review of the decision not to prosecute only when
non-prosecution posed a danger to the victim; if the court sided with the
victim, it would appoint an attorney to prosecute the case.3 4 While ini-
tially proposed as across-the-board reforms, these proposals could also
be adopted only for cases involving allegations of grave human rights
abuses.
the counsel's jurisdiction, the three-judge panel had to order it. Gormley, supra note 283, at
662.
311. See supra notes 304-305 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Cdrdenas, supra note 90; Green, supra note 272; Wainstein, supra note
130.
313. Cdrdenas, supra note 90, at 393.
314. Wainstein, supra note 130, at 727.
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There are numerous ways features of European systems that facili-
tate human rights prosecution could be incorporated into the American
system--on a system-wide basis or just for cases involving human
rights. It is beyond this Note's scope to determine if each is feasible, or
which would be most effective if transplanted. This Note also cannot
evaluate if each reform would pose constitutional problems if adopted in
America, or any other country. In America, at least, any proposal whose
constitutionality has not been tested in another context would likely
spark spirited debate, as the Ethics in Government Act did." 5 The pro-
posals mentioned in this Section are thus offered just as examples of how
mechanisms that work in Europe might be used to facilitate human
rights prosecution in the American system, or any other legal system re-
sembling it.
The American experience with independent counsels, then, confirms
that the features that promote human rights prosecutions in Europe
would also promote them in an American-style system. It also confirms
that these features can be incorporated into an American-style system on
a limited basis; they could be made applicable only to cases involving
human rights. Admittedly, the American independent counsel system
was abandoned due to flaws that allegedly bred excessive prosecution.
But these flaws would be limited if counsels investigated only alleged
human rights abuses. Thus, an independent counsel system for human
rights cases might be one way to transplant desirable features of Euro-
pean systems to America. However, there may be many feasible
alternatives. More broadly speaking, this means that guaranteed compli-
ance with international norms of mandatory prosecution is easily
achievable within an American style system. Guaranteeing prosecution
of human rights offenses in the American system is a realistic proposi-
tion.
CONCLUSION
Over the past few decades, international law has developed dramati-
cally, generating new challenges and new benefits. Individuals who
315. For discussion of early debates about the constitutionality of an independent coun-
sel, see Gormley, supra note 283, at 613-17; History, supra note 134, at 498-500. As
previously mentioned, the Supreme Court resolved these debates, holding the independent
counsel provisions constitutional in Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). For an example
of the constitutional debates that would likely accompany any untested reform proposal based
along civil law lines, compare Green, supra note 272, at 489 ("private prosecution and court
ordered prosecution are constitutionally untenable.") with Wainstein, supra note 130, at 749-
67 (arguing that court appointment of private prosecutors when the public prosecutor fails to
act would not violate the Constitution).
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commit the most serious crimes now violate a developed international
criminal law, a law comprised of treaty provisions andjus cogens norms.
As crimes were established by treaty or recognized as having jus cogens
status, obligations to prosecute grew up alongside of them; now, coun-
tries have obligations to prosecute genocide, torture, forced
disappearances, crimes against humanity, and war crimes when commit-
ted within their territory, when committed abroad by one of their
nationals, or when committed abroad by a foreigner who later enters na-
tional territory.3 16 These obligations, and compliance with them, serve to
deter the heinous crimes to which the obligations are attached." 7 Thus,
they provide potentially powerful protection for lives and liberties
around the globe.
The American justice system, unfortunately, is structured in a way
that makes compliance with these obligations unlikely. This due to a
conflagration of factors. Federal prosecutors have complete discretion
over what crimes to investigate and charge. They are also subject to con-
trol by people who may have-and are somewhat likely to have-an
interest in squelching a human rights case. There is, moreover, no way to
override the decisions these officials take."8 Thus, under the American
system, prosecution of human rights abuses is unlikely.
Under European civil law systems, by contrast, human rights prose-
cutions are more likely to occur when mandated by international law.
This is because their systems have features that facilitate prosecution.
Prosecutors who are independent and compulsory prosecution rules pre-
vent political leaders from stopping prosecution by public authorities.
Victim participation and judges who investigate ensure prosecution can
occur even if political leaders tie the prosecutor's hands.3 9 In countries
with judicial systems marked by at least one of these features, the gov-
ernment will have a difficult time preventing human rights cases from
going forward.
In the recent past, the U.S. had a system that employed some of
these features to handle allegations of misfeasance by top officials. This
independent counsel system was designed to stop officials from obstruct-
ing cases that targeted them, or administration colleagues. This suggests
one possible solution to the quandary identified in Part II: a system of
independent counsels who investigate alleged violations of international
criminal law. At the very least, this shows that there is precedent in the
American system for creating a special mechanism, marked by features
316. See supra notes 14-62 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 63-116 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 119-241 and accompanying text.
(Vol. 25:211
Prosecuting Human Rights Violations
outlined in Part III, to handle special types of crimes, and that applica-
tion of these principles only to human rights cases may therefore be a
feasible, realistic way to facilitate human rights prosecution. More
broadly, this suggests that the American system is not inherently unfit for
a world with international obligations to prosecute; guaranteed compli-
ance is easily achievable within the broad confines of this system.
Not only does examination of how human rights cases will be han-
dled-or not handled-in European and American style legal systems
indicate the need for at least minor reforms in the latter, it also points to
the necessity and desirability of learning from foreign experience as the
world becomes more legally interconnected. 2 0 Development of interna-
tional legal norms creates state obligations that, as was illustrated in Part
II, a given legal system may not be prepared to handle without at least
minimal reform.32' Examination of foreign systems can help in diagnos-
ing these deficiencies, and identifying solutions to them. These norms,
moreover, are designed to produce benefits.3 2 When adoption of princi-
ples from foreign systems is needed to secure these benefits, such
adoption therefore seems desirable.
Comparison of American and European legal systems in light of the
international obligation to prosecute also indicates that human rights
may be a force for convergence between systems. As previously noted,
this is a possibility that others have already observed in another con-
text;323 acceptance of certain universal rights for the accused, they argue,
has led Europeans to embrace some procedures associated with Ameri-
can-style common law systems.324 Comparison of procedures affecting
human rights prosecution reveals that the converse is also true. For
America or any country with a similar legal system, a serious commit-
ment to uphold international human rights law must entail some
incorporation of civil law procedural mechanisms.
Differences in national legal structures are, in sum, highly significant
in the context of international criminal law. This recommends paying
320. For an elegant elaboration of this point, see Rudolf Schlesinger, Comparative
Criminal Procedure, a Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REv. 361, 361-64
(1976-77). On increased legal interconnectedness, see Merryman, supra note 143, at 157-58;
Orentlicher, supra note 12.
321. See supra notes 63-116 and accompanying text. For another example of this phe-
nomena, see John Richardson, The European Union in the World-A Community of Values, 26
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 12, 31 (2002) (noting that development of conventions that form the
basis of the European Union has necessitated convergence of member states' legal systems).
322. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
323. Frase & Weigend, supra note 10, at 358 ("[tlhe fact that Germany (along with other
continental systems) has recognized ... the importance of human rights... as a guiding prin-
ciple of the criminal process has contributed to a process of convergence between the common
law and the civil law systems."); Frase, Main-Streaming, supra note 8, at 781-83.
324. Frase & Weigend, supra note 10, at 358.
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careful attention to those differences, and their implications. The poten-
tial benefits of an established international system of human rights law
are enormous. It would be a shame for domestic legal structures to pre-
vent these benefits from being realized.
